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This chapter discusses the dynamic behavior of exchange rates. It focuses on
both the exchange rate's response to exogenous disturbances and the relation bet—
weenexchange—rate movements and movements in such endogenous variables as nominal
and relativeprices, interest rates, output, and the current account. These
questionsare addressed in avariety of models, some of which are based on postu-
lated supply and demand functions for assets and goods, and some of which are
based on an explicit utility—maximizing problem. Similar models are studied
elsewhere in this volume (especially in chapter 14 by Frenkel and Mussa, in
chapter 15 by Branson and Henderson, and in chapter 20 by Marston), but the
approach taken here is different. We do not attempt to present a single, unifying
model that encompasses as special cases those discussed in the literature.
Instead, we try to emphasize the common or unique features of the alternative
models.
Anideal treatment of exchange-rate dynamics would begin by summarizing the
relevant characteristics of the empirical record. All key features of the
stochastic processes that appear to govern exchange rates and other statistically
related economic variables would be catalogued. Then, a set of models that are
compatible with at least some of the observed relationships would be presented.
The discussion would point to features of the models that are consistent with the
data and to features that are not; and it would highlight implications that might
allow economists to distinguish among alternative models through future empirical
research.
Wehavenot attempted to attain this ideal,inlarge part because itwouldbe
prematureto doso on the basis of our limited data on exchange-rate behavior.
Onlya fewcentral banks have allowed more than intermittent floating, and the
time series covering even extended periods of floatingare relativelyshort.—2—
Thus, while high-frequency characteristics of exchange-rate changes have been
studied with some success in recent years, studies of the lower-frequency charac-
teristics of exchange-rate changes, corresponding to periodicities more common to
macroeconomic phenomena, have proven less conclusive (reese and Rogoff, 1983;
Shafer and Loopesko, 1983). Another shortcoming of our data is the absence of
quantifiable information about inherently unobservable market expectations. As
the chapter illustrates, alternative expectational scenarios can give rise to very
different empirical correlations between exchange-rate movements and changes in
other observable variables.
In the face of limited data, economists have naturally concentrated their
research on models consistent with what appear to be the stylized facts of the
interwar and post-1973 experiences with floating. Earlier studies, which drew on
the hyperinflatioriary episodes of the interwar period, emphasized the key role of
monetary factors in exchange-rate determination (Frenkel, 1976). The more
moderate inflation and repeated real shocks of the post—1973 period highlight dif-
ferent empirical regularities, however. Ainong these are the strong correlations
between exchange-rate movements and movements in terms of trade, the high variabi-
lity of exchange rates compared to that of international price-level ratios, and
the on-again, off—again relationship between the exchange rate and the current
account (Genberg, 1978; Frenkel and Mussa, 1980; Flood, 1981; Shafer and
Loopesko, 1983). All the models discussed in this chapter grew out of attempts
to reconcile exchange—rate theory with at least some of these stylized facts.
Along with the empirical regularities, the rational—expectations "revolution"
in macroeconomics has had an important impact on exchange-rate theory. The models
reviewed below reflect that intellectual development in a number of ways.
Following Black (1973), these models endow agents with rational expectations about
the future. Some extend the recent closed—economy business—cycle literature by—3—
exploring channels through which money can exert a persistent influenceon output
in open economies. Finally, Lucas' (1976) celebrated critique ofpolicy eva-
luation finds expression in the attempts described below to basedynamic exchange—
rate theory on the explicit intertemporal optimization problems of individual
agents.
A recurring theme of the chapter is the distinction we make betweenthe
intrinsic and extrinsic sources of an econon's dynamics. An intrinsicsource of
dynamics causes movement even when all exogenous variables that affect theeconomy
are expected to remain constant forever. An example of intrinsic dynamic behavior
is the adjustment of the capital stock to its steady—state level ina growth
model. In contrast, extrinsic dynamics are associated exclusively withcurrent or
anticipated future changes in exogenous variables. A system with extrinsicdyna-
mics only is stationary in the absence of such external shocks. Ourdistinction
between intrinsic and extrinsic dynamics corresponds closely to Samuelson's(1947)
distinction between "causal" and "historical" dynamicsystems.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explores thesimplest model
in which the relation among the exchange rate, pricelevels, and the terms of
trade can be addressed. This flexible-price, small—country modelallows domestic
and foreign consumption goods to be imperfect substitutes, but itincludes no
monetary non-neutralities and no intrinsic dynamics. Even so, the model predicts
that current or anticipated future real shocks will induce simultaneousmovements
of the nominal exchange rate and the terms of trade.Further, exchange rates may
be more volatile than price levels when real shocksare dominant. While the
exchange rate certainly displays asset-price characteristics, it alsoplays a
role in accommodating required shifts in relative goodsprices. The exchange
rate's behavior is thus affected both by forces emphasized inthe monetary
approach to the exchange rate (Frenkel and Mussa, chapter 14) and by forcesempha-
sized in the older elasticities approach.—4—
Section 3 introduces market frictions so that the role of endogenous output
fluctuations can be studied. Section 3.1 alters the previous section's model by
assuming that the money price of domestic goods is a predetermined or non—jumping
variable that must adjust gradually in the face of goods-market disequilibrium.
The assumption of domestic price stickiness reinforces both the correlation bet-
ween exchange-rate and terms-of—trade changes and the high short-run variability
of the exchange rate compared to that of international price-level ratios.
Moreover, the price-adjustment process through which goods-market imbalance is
gradually eliminated adds an intrinsic component to the economy's dynamics. These
intrinsic dynamics are reflected in the persistent effects of disturbances on out-
put, prices, and interest rates. SectIon 3.2 investigates alternative market
frictions (and alternative sources of persistence) based on more detailed descrip-
tions of the Institutional or informational environment. Some of the models are
stochastic, and their solution involves rules for inducing a probability distribu-
tion function on the exchange rate from the probability distributions of various
exogenous variables. These solutions are different from those of the previous
deterministic models, whose equilibria can be conveniently represented as solu-
tions to systems of differential equations.
Section 4 returns to a setting of frictionless markets to study the links bet-
ween asset accumulation and the exchange rate. The adjustment of foreign assets
and domestic capital to their steady—state levels provide new sources of intrinsic
dynamic behavior. Within this framework, it is shown that the relationship bet-
ween the exchange rate and current account, even along paths converging to a
fixed long-run equilibrium, is very loose. The models studied here reveal chan-
nelsthrough which money can influence real variables even in the absence of
market frictions.—5—
Section 5 examines deterministic and stochastic models in which individual
behavior is derived from an explicit intertemporal optimization problem. These
models serve at least three related purposes. First, they are suggestive of
assumptions under which the aggregate behavioral relations postulated in previous
sections' models are consistent with individual maximizing behavior. Second, they
provide a natural setting inwhichsome welfare consequences of macroeconomic
policiescan be assessed. Third, because they are built up on the basis of pre-
ferences that are invariant with respect to policy change, they provide vehicles
for policy analysis that are less vulnerable than models discussed earlier to
Lucas'(1976)critique. Money is introduced into these optimizing models in
ratherad hoc ways, however, so their immunity to Lucas' criticisms is less than
total. t'bnetheless, the approach discussed in this section leads to a deeper
perspective on the possible causes of the observed empirical regularities.
Section 6 contains concluding remarks.—6—
2.Expectations and the Exchange Rate in a Simple Flexible-Price Model
This section studies exchange-rate determination in a rational—expectations
model with flexible prices. The model abstracts from the possible intrinsic sour—
ces of dynamics to be introduced in sections 3 and 4 below, and thus highlights
the extrinsic component of exchange-rate dynamics. As was noted in section 1,
intrinsic dynamics lead to changes in a model's endogenous variables that need
not be associated with current or expected future changes in the levels of exoge-
nous variables that impinge on the economy. Extrinsic dynamics, in contrast,
arise exclusively in response to such exogenous events.
The model set out, which comes from Mussa (1977, 1982), displays some impor-
tant channels through which current and anticipated future disturbances, both
monetary and real, affect exchange rates. In addition, it illustrates the impli-
cations of rational expectations for exchange-rate dynamics. (The environment
assumedinthis section is non- stochastic, so "rational expectations' Is equiva-
lentto "perfect foresight" here.) The model also provides a useful benchmark for
the analysis in later sections, particularly section 3's discussion of exchange-
rate dynamics under short-run price inflexibility.
2.1 The Model
Consider a small open economy specialized in the production of a good that is
animperfect substitute inconsumption for an imported good.1 Wealth may be held
In the form of domestic fiat money (which is not held by foreigners) or in the
formof interest—bearing bonds. Bonds denominated In either domestic or foreign
currency are available, but these are perfect substitutes in portfolios. Thus,
any difference between the nominal returns they offer is offset exactly by an
expected change in the exchange rate.2 The resulting (uncovered) interest-parity
condition is written as
(2.1)rt=r+—7
where r is the nominal interest rate on domestic—currency bonds, r* is the rate on
foreign—currency bonds, and e is the natural logarithm of the exchange rate,
defined as the price of foreign money in terms of domestic money. (A rise in a
Is a depreciaton of the currency.) Unless otherwise noted, lower—case letters
denote natural logarithms of the corresponding upper—case variables, except when
representing rates of Interest. A dot denotes a variable's (right—hand) time
derivative.
Assume that agents have perfect foresight concerning all disturbances other
than initial, unanticipated shocks that dislodge the economy from its previously
expected trajectory. Perfect foresight is an assumption of convenience, and we
could easily transplant the model explored here to an explicitly stochastic
setting without changing its main implications (Mussa, 1982). The perfect—
foresight assumption permits us to Identify the expected rate of change of the
exchange rate with the actual rate of change.
Let m denote the nominal money supply (an exogenous variable under a floating
exchange rate), p the home—currency price of domestic output, p the foreign—
currency price of imports, I the share of the home good in domestic consumption,
and y domestic output. Equilibrium in the money market requires that
(2.2) mt —Pt
—(1—y)(et+ i)
=P [Pt+ t —Pt
—(1—y)(et+pt)]
—Art, i< 1.
The left—hand side of (2.2) represents real money balances expressed In terms of
the appropriate consumer—price Index. Note that (2.2) can be rewritten as
(2.3) mt — — (1—ct)(et+ r')= — Art
where a y + (1 —I).—8—
'1e assume that aggregate (domestic plus foreign) demand for domestic output,
d, is negatively related to the contemporaneous relative price of the domestic
good in terms of the foreign good, p —e—p.If this relative price were
constant over time, there would be a unique intertermporal price of consump-
tion at time t0interms of consumption at any other time t1;andthis relative
price would depend only on the path of r —p.If the contemporaneous relative
price of domestic and foreign goods changes over time, however, there are two
intertemporal relative prices between any two dates tç and t1, one in terms of
domestic goods and one in terms of foreign goods. For purposes of the present
benchmark model, we assume that aggregate demand depends on an average intertem—
poral price expressed in terms of the home consumption bundle..1e also assume
that only the "instantaneous' average intertemporal relative price, the domestic
real interest rate r — — (1—y)(&+ f*),affectsaggregate demand.3
Under the foregoing assumptions, aggregate demand is given by
(2.4) dt =4(et+ p Pt)(rt — — (1—Y)(&t +f)]÷
whereg is a demand—shift factor such as government consumption. In this
flexible—price model, aggregate demand must always equal the natural or full—
employmentlevel of output y,
(2.5)dt =Yt.
Note that the terms of trade between domestic and foreign goods are endoge-
nously determined. In contrast, the paths of p and r* are exogenously determined
in world markets where the economy under study plays an insignificant part.
The model may be reduced to a system of t non-autonomous differential
equations in e and p,
—a *a
(2.6) et —s-—(et+ Pt) +-rPt
—- Xt — Pt—9—
(2.7)= ( - ) (et+p)+ (+ Pt
- -Xt Ay Aty A
where x and z are linear combinations of exogenous variables:
*.* (2.8) Xt= mt—
PYt+A(rt
—Pt)
(2.9)z gt —— (r pt).
Let wc/ay. A general solution to the differential—equation system is
k2a exp(wt)
(2.10)et =k1exp(t/A) +f exp [(t—s)/X] x ds
+ {exp [(t—s)/X] -exp[(t-s)J}(z5/)ds -p,
(2.11)Pt =k1exp(t/A) ÷k2exp('t) + -fexp [(t—s)/A] x ds
+ f exp [(t—s)/A](z5/) ds + f exp[w(t—s) ](z/4) ds
where k1 and k2 are arbitrary constants (see, e.g., Hirsch and Smale, 1974).
The arbitrary constants k1 and k2 reflect a fundamental indeterminacy in
models assuming rational expectations or perfect foresight. The Indeterminacy is
a consequence of the self—fulfilling nature of those expectations. Returning to
(2.1) and (2.3), we note that, given p, any level of the exchange rate iscon—
sistent with money—market equilibrium provided the perfectly—foreseen depreciation
rate e satisfies (2.6). SimIlarly, (2.4) implies that any pricep clears the
goods market, given e and r, provided the rate of price increase p, and hence the
real interest rate, is appropriate. Because a higher e requires a highere,
ceteris paribus, to clear the money market, and because a higherp calls for a
higher p, ceteris paribus, to clear the goods market, the characteristic roots— 10—
X1and w of the differential—equation system given by (2.6) and (2.7) are posi-
tive. Because the constants k1 and k2 multiply time exponeritials in those posi-
tive roots, any particular solution for e and p in which k1 or k2 differs from
zero will entail explosive price behavior unrelated to market "fundamentals" ——
whatmight be called a "speculative bubble," since prices explode only because
they are expected to do so (Sargent and Wallace, 1973; Flood and Garber, 1980).
It has become standard in the exchange—rate literature to resolve this inde—
terminacy by identifying as "the" equilibrium of the economy the (hopefully) uni-
que market—clearing price vector which excludes such speculativebubbles.4 In the
present context, this amounts to taking as the equilibrium exchange rate and
domestic—goods price the particular solution to (2.6) and (2.7) incorporating
the initial conditions k1 =k2=0.This choice of initial conditions is said to
place the economy on its saddle path. The saddle—path assumption is an appealing
one because it stipulates that prices depend only on current and expected future
demand and supply conditions In markets; further, as we shall see, the assumption
yields intuitively reasonable results.5 The saddle—path solutions for the
flexible—price equilibrium exchange rate and domestic—goods price, given by (2.6)
and (2.7) with k1 =k2=0,are denoted byand .
Denotethe price of exports in terms of imports by q =p—e—p.We will
refer to q as the terms of trade. (It is sometimes referred to as the real
exchange rate, though we will reserve that term for its other common usage as
the price of non—traded in terms of traded goods.) Along the saddle path
(2.12) t =w7exp{(t_s)fl{g55_a(r*_p*)]/}ds,
Several features of these solutions are worthy of note. As (2.12) shows, the
equilibrium terms of trade are independent of domesticand foreign monetary fac—— 11—
tors.q depends exclusively on current and anticipated future shocks to real
variables: aggregate demand, aggregate supply, and the world real interestrate,
r* —p*•Inother words, purely monetary disturbances induce proportionalmovements
in exchange rates and international price—level ratios, aspurchasing—power parity
theory would predict. Because the domestic real interest rate can be writtenas
—
yZi—f*,it is also unaffected by monetary developments. Thus, the flexible—
price model developed here implies a complete dichotomy between the real andmone-
tary sectors.
Real as well as monetary disturbances can affect the exchangerate, however.
In fact, any real disturbance requiring a movement in theequilibrium terms of
trade must be accommodated in part through an exchange ratechange and in part
through.a change in home goods prices, with the overall price levelmoving so as
to maintain money—market equilibrium (Stockman,1980; Obstfeld, 1980;Mussa, 1982;
Helpman and Razin, 1982; Lucas, 1982; Sachs, l983a). For example, (2.12) shows that
a permanent shift in the path of aggregate demand from g5} to {g5 +
causesthe terms of trade to rise by = To bring this rise about, the
exchange rate falls (the domestic currency appreciates) by —cz(gI4,),
while the output price rises by t(l—a)(g/c).The corresponding change in
the consumer price index is yA + (1—i)i =—ip(l—y)(g/4),while the change in
the value of domestic output (in terms of the consumption bundle)is (1—y)(Tt —
(l—y)(tgI).The increased demand for money (due to the increase in real
income) exactly matches the fall in the consumer price index,so money—market
equilibrium is maintained [see (2.2)]. The exchange rate's role inequilibrating
the domestic goods market Is reminiscent of the traditionalelasticities approach
to the exchange rate.
Note that if I1 or j' =0,the consumer price index is unaffected even
though the exchange rate falls. Also note that, depending on the value of
c&,— 12—
thechange in the exchange rate may be larger or smaller than the change in the
nominal price of domestic goods. Consequently, the model can be consistent with
the empirical observation that exchange rates are often more volatile than the
nominal prices of goods (Flood, 1981).
A corollary of the foregoing observations is that a negative correlation bet-
ween movements in exchange rates and changes in the terms of trade does not imply
any stickiness in domestic—goods prices. The demand shock g analyzed above forces
the exchange rate to appreciate in real as well as nominal terms, but it does not
induce goods—market disequilibrium. Nominal price rigidities can cause exchange
rates and terms of trade to move in opposite directions even in response to mone-
tary shocks, but the pattern may also emerge as the equilibrium response of the
economy to real disturbances requiring adjustment in relative goods prices.
The saddle—path solutions forandimply that a change in p, given the
paths of r* and f*,isexactly offset by an equal and opposite change in e, so
that p and q are unaffected. A flexible exchange rate therefore insulates the
domestic economy against this disturbance. Similarly, the domestic economy is
completely insulated against a change in. the foreign inflation rate if the
foreign nominal interest rate fully reflects this change.6
The domestic economy is not insulated against foreign real disturbances,
however. A change in the foreign real interest rate r* —paffects both p and q
as well as e. A permanent, unanticipated increase in r* alone, for example,
causes the terms of trade to change by the amount —a/k. This fall in the terms of
trade is accommodated partly through a depreciation of the domestic currency
(d/dr*A + (c&a/$)) and partly through a change in the nominal price of the
domestic good (d/dr*A —[(1—cz)ci/4J).
2.2 Anticipated Future Disturbances
Although the model just described has no intrinsic dynamics, prices will move— 13—
overin time in response to anticipated changes in exogenous variables. Only when
the exogenous variables are expected to be constant forever will e and p be
constant as well. To illustrate these extrinsic dynamics we consider the
economy's response to a permanent increase in the money supply that is announced
to the public in advance of its occurrence. The exercise (similar to those per-
formed by Sargent and Wallace, 1973, and Brock, 1975, for closed economies) yields
some important insights into exchange—rate and price behavior under rational
expectations.
To fix ideas, it is assumed that, prior to the announcement at time t0 that
the money stock will increase by an amount zn at time t =T> 0, the money stock was
expected to remain constant at level rn forever. If we add the assumption that all
other exogenous variables remain fixed throughout, then the economy is in a sta-
tionary state, prior to t=O, with —c/4— and + (1—cz)z/p. Here, x
and zaregiven by (2.8) and (2.9) evaluated at the constant levels of the exoge-
nous variables (with f= 0)and j5 is the fixed foreign—goods price. The announ-
cement of the future policy action causes the exchange rate and domestic—goods
price to jump upward immediately. The path of the economy from t0 onward is
described by
- +exp [(t-T)/A]-- (0t<)
(2.13) et — —* +Em czz/4 —p (tT),
-(;+exp[(t-T)/AJ n + (1-/ (OQ<1)
(2.14) Pt i... —
+tm + (1—a) z/ (tT).
Both e and p jump by exp(—T/X)m at t0 and then rise smoothly until t=T, when
their new stationary values are attained. The terms of trade are at no time
affected by this purely monetary disturbance.
It is important to note that neither the exchange rate nor the price of
domestic output jumps when the money stock jumps at time tT. Between times 0 and— 14—
T,the exchange rate depreciates at an accelerating pace, inducing a rising nomi-
nal interest rate that maintains money—market equilibrium as the price level rises
and real balances shrink. At time T, when the money supply is increased, the
depreciation rate drops to zero and the home interest rate drops back to the
constant world level r*. The interest rate's fall creates an increase in real
money demand just equal to the Increase in the real money supply at the current
price level, removing any need for a discrete jump in e or p at that moment.
The economic explanation of this result is fundamental. The jump In prices at
time t=O discounts to the present the expected future monetary expansion and
thereby eliminates the possibility of an anticipated discrete jump in the exchange
rate (and the price of domestic goods) along the economy's subsequent path. To
see how the market discounts expected future events Inthismanner, suppose that a
sharpjump in the exchange rate could occur at time T.Because such a jump would
implyan instantaneously Infinitereal rate of capital loss on domestic—currency
assets,investors would have an incentive to move into foreign exchange an Instant
before time T, causing e (and p) to jump earlier than expected. The contradiction
is removed if prices jump only at time t0, when the news of the future distur-
bance first arrives.7
Another implication of the rational—expectations assumption deserves emphasis.
In a world where prices move in anticipatiorb of future events, one may not observe
any clear correlation between exchange—rate movements and contemporaneous move-
ments in the exogenous determinants of the exchange rate. The example given above
shows that prices rise in advance of an expected money—supply Increase; if the
increase is permanent, prices and money will have risen proportionally by the time
the money stock rises. There is an additional problem in a world with
uncertainty: the exchange rate may react sharply to heightened probabilities of
future policies which do not actually materialize, even though it was reasonable
exante to expect that they might. Partly for this reason, attempts to explain— 15—
historicalexchange—rate movements in terms of observable "fundamentals" have
often been unconvincing.
It is instructive to examine the features of the model that produce the dyna-
mics described above. The two key parameters that generate currentresponses to
anticipated future disturbances are the interest—elasticity of the demand for
money (A) and the interest—elasticity of aggregate demand for domestic output (ci).
It is easy to see that if both A and ciarezero, then neither e nor p responds to
anticipated future changes in any exogenous variable until those changes actually
occur.8 Theabsence of any interest—rate sensitivity severs the link between the
present and the future in this section's model.
If the Interest—elasticity of money demand is negative (A > 0) but ci=0,the
model can be written as a single differential equation ine, together with an
equation for p:
(2.15) t=(et+ P)—+ (Xt
—zt/$)—
(2.16) = +p÷zt/+
Here, z is given by (2.9) with a =0.Now anticipated future changes in m, y, g,
or r* —affectthe current exchange rate and home—output price, since the
saddle-path solution to (2.15) is
(2.17) t=I f(x5— exp[(t-s)/X]ds —
However, It is obvious from (2.9) and (2.16) that the terms of tradeq =(—y)Iq
areunaffected by these anticipated future changes (given the current values of
and g). Thus, while e cannot make anticipated discrete jumps,p and q can.
Anticipated discrete terms—of—trade jumps imply instantaneously infinite expected
domestic real Interest rates. But when a0, there is no incentive for the
market to smooth such jumps through intertemporal substitutionin consumption.— 16—
Althoughcurrent real variables are unaffected by changes in anticipations of
future variables in this case, current nominal variables are affected by changes
in anticipations of both future nominal and future real variables. For example,
the exchange—rate effect of an increase in anticipated future domestic output is
ambiguous and works through two channels. First, by increasing the future demand
for money and reducing the future price level and exchange rate, it increases the
current demand for money and reduces the current price level and exchange rate.
This effect is captured by the term x5 in (2.17). Second, a future increase in
output reduces future q, partly through a rise in e. The expected fall in q is
larger the smaller Is 4), and the fraction of the fall in q that occurs as an
increase in e is larger the larger is c. This second factor tends to raise the
current price level and exchange rate by reducing current money demand. Its
effect is captured by the term z5 in (2.17).
If the interest elasticity of aggregate demand is negative (a>O) but X0, then
the model becomes:
(2.18) 4= +[Ytgt ÷ c(r —
(2.19)t
=m+ (l—)t —'1);;t.
[Equation (2.19) is an open—economy analogue of the monetary equilibrium con-
dition postulated in the classical quantity theory of money.J The saddle—path
solution to (2.18) is equation (2.12); the exchange rate is given by
(2.20) t m —4t
—4t
—p.
With intertemporal substitution In the goods market (>O), the current terms of
trade are naturally a function of future values of real variables. Discrete
anticipated jumps in q are not possible. But while the exchange rate is a func-
tion of current and future values of the real variables in the model, it is not a— 17—
functionof future money supplies. When A =0,expected sharp jumps in e
(and p) clearly can occur.
The influence of future real variables on e is greater for greater values of
a, while the effect of future variables on p approaches zero as y (and hence a)
approaches one. Values of I close to one are thus consistent with the idea that
changesin expected future real variables have a large effect on the current
exchange rate but a small effect on the current nominal price of domestic goods.
(Ina sense, I =1means that both the exchange rate and terms of trade behave as
"assetprices" ——theydepend on a whole time path of future real variables ——
whilethe nominal price of domestic goods does not.)
2.3 Expected Regime Change and Exchange Rate-Dynamics
The discussion has so far neglected the possibility of drastic institutional
or structural changes in the economy. This section is concerned with the
influence of expected regime change on exchange—rate behavior. The problems
Involved are illustrated by the example of an anticipated future return to a fixed
exchange rate. Future exchange—rate pegging implies an expected transition from a
regime in which the money supply is exogenous and the exchange rate is endogenous
to one in which the money supply is endogenously determined.
Models involving regime change have their roots in papers by Salant and
Henderson (1978) and Salant (1983) describing the breakdown of government price—
fixing schemes in natural resource markets. Salant and Henderson showed that
under rational expectations, the timing of speculative attacks on government
resource stockpiles can be uniquely determined by the familiar requirement (cf. sec-
tion 2.2) that the resource price not make an anticipated discrete jump as specu-
lators acquire the government's reserves. Krugman (1979) extended their analysis
to the foreign exchange market, demonstrating that the date at which a fixed
exchange rate collapses in a sudden balance—of—payments crisis is also well— 18—
definedin terms of official policies and private preferences. Flood and
Garber (1983) use a stochastic model to study the problem that concerns us in this
section, the influence of expected future fixing on the behavior of a currently
floating exchange rate.9
A return to fixed exchange rates is analyzed in two steps. First, we ask what
the value of the exchange rate must be just after the regime change occurs.
Second, we determine the extent to which the current exchange rate must discount
the expected future event if there is to be no sharp jump In prices at the moment
the event takes place.
Suppose that at time t0 the monetary authority announces its intention of
fixing the exchange rate permanently at a time t T in the future. The level at
which the exchange rate is to be pegged is denoted by e. To focus on the effect
of the announcement itself, we assume that the entire future path of g and the
path of the money supply between times 0 and T are unaffected by the
announcement.'°
The analysis proceeds by deriving the equilibrium that will prevail under a
fixed exchange rate regime and then "working backward" to time t0. When the
exchange rate Is fixed at e, goods—market equilibrium can be written
(2.21) t •(e + —Pt)—a[r
—Yt
—(1—Y)]+ gt
where we have made use of the fact that r —r*when no change in the exchange
rate Is expected. The saddle—path solution to differential equation (2.21) is
(2.22) p — + p + wfexp[w(t—s)}(z5/)ds.
An "f" superscript denotes a variabl&s equilibrium value under a fixed—rate
reg line.
The domestic money supply becomes an endogenous, jumping variable under fixed— 19—
ratesand capital mobility. Equations (2.3) and (2.22) imply that equilibrium
nominal balances are given by
(2.23) m = +(1 —) (+p)+ —Xr
E + p + uwf exp {w(t—s)] (z5/)ds + —Ar.
Equation (2.22) relates the equilibrium output price to the exchange rate, to the
world price level, and to current and expected values of variables that disturb
the terms of trade. Monetary factors play no role: changes in money demand or
supply are accommodated or offset through the capital account. According to
(2.23), devaluation is neutral in the present setting. A rise in e leads to
equiproportionate increases in the home—goods price and the nominal money stock,
but has no real effects.
Even though the exchange rate is to be pegged at time T, the behavior of pri-
ces during the interval between times 0 and T is governed by equations (2.6) and
(2.7). Because these equations do not apply after T, it is convenient to write a








(2.25) Ptkfexp(t/A) + kexp(wt) +..fexp[(t—s)/X]x5ds
+
1 exp{(t—s)/A](z9/)ds + fexp[w(t—s)](zs/+)ds
(0 t<T), where kf and k are arbitrary constants. (It is assumed that
a*0.) To trace out the economy's path over the time interval (0,T), we must deter-— 20—
mineappropriate values for kfand k
These values are determined by the requirements that the exchange rate and
domestic—goods price not jump discretely at time T. In other words, the system's
T —
Initialconditions must result in a path for prices such that e =eand
t T
=p,, where the latter price is given by equation(2.22). Setting t =Tin




(2.27)k2 = f exp(—ws) (zs/+)ds
Substitution of (2.26) and (2.27) into (2.24) and (2.25) yields the equilibrium
prices prevailing between dates 0 and T.
It was assumed above that the only changes accompanying the announcement
of future pegging are changes in the monetary policy pursued after the ex-
change rate is fixed. That assumption yields a compact and revealing represen-
tation of the effect of future pegging. Let}0denotethe price path
that would have prevailed in the absence of any move to fix the exchange rate;
andare given by equations (2.10) and (2.11) with k1 =k2=0.The initial con-
ditions (2.26) and (2.27) imply that the paths of the exchange rate and the
domestic—goods price between time 0 and T can be written in the form
(2.28) =— eT)exp[(tT)1X1
(2.29) = (; — eT)exp[(tT)1A]
The foregoing expressions make clear that the change in the exchange rate's
path (relative to its unperturbed level) depends on the relation between the new
peg e and the exchange rate that would have prevailed at time T in the absence— 21—
ofthe regime change.If e < eT, for example, the announcement of future pegging
leads to an immediate appreciation of the currency relative to its previously
anticipated path; remains below for the balance of the floating—rate period,
and the divergence between the two grows exponentially at rate 1/A. As was
assumed in the solution procedure, ä reaches e at time T, so that pegging can
take place with no discrete movement of the exchange rate. Figure 2.1 illustrates
the path just described.
The evolution of the domestic goods price relative to its predisturbance path
Is identical to that of the exchange rate. This Is not surprising: because the
regime change is a change only in the process determining nominal magnitudes, it
has no effect on the path of the terms of trade. It is noteworthy that as T +
theeffect of future pegging on the economy's path becomes progressively smaller.
Further, If the exchange rate is to be pegged at time T at the value that would
have materialized in the absence of a regime change, the announcement does not
alter the economy's path between times 0 and T in any way.
As figure 2.1 suggests, pegging generally entails a change in the currency's
depreciation rate, and hence a change in the domestic nominal interest rate.
Because the real—balance deflator cannot jump at time T, a discrete change in the
demand for real balances is implied. How is this change in demand accommodated
when no jump in the price level is possible? To peg the exchange rate at time T,
the central bank Intervenes In the foreign exchange market: it sells domestic
money and buys foreign reserves if pegging results in a rise in money demand, but
buys money and loses reserves in the opposite case. Central—bank intervention
thus facilitates the private—sector portfolio shift that may be necessary to main-
tain continuous money—market equilibrium. If the nominal interest rate falls at
the instant of pegging, there is a momentary capital inflow, and if it rises,







3.Market Frictions and Output Fluctuations
The assumptions of perfect price flexibility and full information are now
relaxed so that we may study how market frictions influence the exchange rate's
dynamic response to official policy shifts and other exogenous disturbances. We
first explore a stylized 'sticky—price' model in which the nominal price of
domestic ouput is constrained to be a slowly—adjusting variable. Then we consider
more detailed models in which pre—negotiated contracts, imperfect information, or
both lie behind the tendency of goods prices to appear sluggish when compared to
the exchange rate.
Models of exchange rate dynamics with sticky prices are direct descendants of
the open—economy IS—LM models developed by Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1968).
This type of model is studied in section 3.1, below. The Mundell—Fleming approach
begins with a Keynesian economy characterized by rigid domestic prices and demand—
determined output; that economy is •opened" by introducing international trade and
capital movements. Shocks to the goods and asset markets lead to once—and—for—all
adjustments of the exchange rate, rather than to a dynamic process of macroecono-
mic adjustment. These equilibrating exchange—rate movements are in fact terms—of—
trade changes which are maintained indefinitely even when the initial shock is
monetary.
The static Mundell—Fleming model of exchange—rate determination proved inade-
quate as an analytical tool in the inflationary environment of the i97O's. The
dynamic Mundell—Fleming models, developed primarily by Dornbusch (1976b) and Mussa
(1977, 1982), extended the earlier framework in two important respects. First,
while retaining the assumption that the nominal price of domestic output is fixed
(i.e., predetermined) at any moment In time, the dynamic models allow that price
to adjust over time in response to deviations between aggregate demand and the
full—employment level of output. A monetary expansion, for example, induces not
only a temporary rise in outputand fall in the terms of trade, but also an infla—— 23—
tionaryprocess in which the initial expansionary impact is dissipated and
purchasing—power parity is restored. Second, the dynamic models endow market par-
ticipants with rational expectations of exchange rate and price movements.
The foregoing discussion highlights two distinct sources of dynamics: the
equilibrium adjustment of prices to current and anticipated future movements in
exogenous variables, and the adjustment of prices and quantities as goods—market
disequilibrium is eliminated over time. The first source of dynamics is extrin-
sic, and was contained in the flexible—price model presented in section 2.The
second source of dynamics is intrinsic to the sticky—price model.
The sticky—price assumption produces models mimicking the observed tendency of
international price—level ratios to exhibit considerably less volatility than the
corresponding exchange rates. Moreover, the intrinsic dynamics of such a system
imply that monetary and other disturbances result in temporary yet persistent
deviations of output, goods prices, and asset prices from the values they would
assume in a frictionless equilibrium. But while the sticky—price model is useful
as a descriptive tool, it does not analyze the institutional or informational
features of the economy that might result in an apparently sluggish price level.
Because the precise source of market frictions is crucial for policy analysis,
attention has recently been given to exchange—rate models in which contracts and
informational asymmetries give rise to monetary non—neutrality. This type of
model is the subject of section 3.2. The policy implications of contracting
models are of course very different from those of models based exclusively on
imperfectinformation; however, all the models discussed in section 3. 2 predict
that monetary shocks (at least when imperfectlyperceived)will have persistent,
but not permanent, effects on output. As is illustrated below, the intrinsic dyna-
mics of these models can arise from such sources as inventory adjustment, multi—
period contracts, and external asset accumulation. Because the last source of— 24—
dynamicsis properly the province of section 4, it is touched on only briefly in
this section.
3.1 Sticky Domestic Prices and Overshooting
The sticky—price model retains the continuous asset—market equilibrium that
was a feature of section 2, but stipulates that the domestic output price is a
predetermined or non—jumping variable that can adjust only over time. Both key
features of the sticky—price model——instantaneous asset—market clearing and per-
fect short—run output—price rigidity——are surely extreme characterizations of
actual market adjustment. Nonetheless, these polar extremes yield an analytically
tractable model that highlights neatly the dynamic implications of different
adjustment speeds between markets. (Niehans, 1977, and Frenkel and Rodriguez,
1982, study models in which some asset markets adjust slowly.) The most
celebrated implication of this type of model is Dornbusch's (1976b) finding that
when the price of home goods is sticky, the exchange rate may "overshoot' its
eventual level in the short run In reponse to a permanent change In the money
supply.
To introduce price stickiness into the exchange rate model of section 2, we
replace the goods—market equilibrium condition (2.5) with the assumption that
domestic output y is identically equal to aggregate demand, d. Demand—determined
output might be the result of pre—negotiatd nominal wage contracts which require
workers to supply all the labor demanded by firms at the contract wage. However,
the labor market is not modeled explicitly (see section 3.2, below). It is assumed
that the price of domestic goods moves upward over time In response to both the
excess of output y over its natural level y and a measure of "equilibrium" infla-
tionary expectations. The expectatlonal component of the price—adjustment rule is
crucial. A rule omitting this component is analogous to a pre—Phelps—Frledman
Phillips curve, and, as Mussa (1982) observes, yields a model In which constant— 25—
monetarygrowth is inconsistent with an inflationary steady state unless output
remains perpetually above its natural level.
To obtain the expectations term in the pricing rule, we define a price p by




Note thatequates aggregate demand to the natural output level for current
values of the other variables. We then assume the price—adjustment scheme postu-
lated by Mussa (1977, 1982):
(3.2) =8(—Yt)+ t =O(dt
—Yt)+ Pt
According to (3.2), producers adjust prices to reduce excess demand and to ensure
that prices "keep up" with changes in their current equilibrium level."
The model is described by (2.1) —(2.4),(3.1), and (3.2). We solve the model
by steps (as in Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1984), first finding the equilibrium terms of
trade and then using that solution to find the equilibrium exchange rate and home—
goods price. To this end, it is convenient to formulate the model in terms of
deviations from the flexible—price equilibrium studied in section 2; thus, we
define q —t, e—, and p—
By (2.18), the flexible—price terms of tradeobey the equation
(3.3) t = + —gt+ a(r —)}/ay
Differentiating (3.1) and (3.3) with respect to time and using (2.1), (3.2), and
(3.3), we obtain an autonomous second—order differential equation in 4:
(3.4) =L(1—Oay)kt+
A general solution to (3.4) is 4kiexp (wt) + k2 exp (—04t), where k1 and k2
are constants. Saddle-path equilibrium again requires that the coefficient k1 of
the explosive exponential be set at zero. But (3.4) possesses a negative root,
—84, associated with the predetermined nominal price of domestic goods. (The
negative sign of this root reflects the stabilizing effect of excess demand on— 26—
prices.)Because the initial equilibrium terms of trade q0 will not generally
coincide with the flexible—price value in this sticky—price model, the addi-







As(3.5) shows, the price—adjustment scheme (3.2) drives the real exchange rate
toward its flexible—price value at an exponential rate.






which,when combined with (3.6), implies that
(3.8) t =(4)t+[— )1÷
Equations(3.7) and (3.8) constitute an autonomous system in 4 and ci.The
saddlepath solution forleads to the expression
—(q —)[a—j(1+ Oy)J
(3.9) et = + A04) exp(—8ct)+
—(p0
— — pc(1+ Gay)] — =
[(i—c) +p4(1 ÷ Oai) +0jexp(—Gt)
+ et







Expressions (3.9) and (3.10) show that the exchange rate and domestic—goods
price will differ from their flexible—price equilibrium values whenever the prede-
termined initial output price p0 differs from the value that would prevail in the
hypothetical Walrasian equilibrium of the flexible—price model. The adjustment
rule (3.2) drives the discrepancy p —to zero at rate 04. According to (3.9), e
converges toat that rate.— 27—
Asin the flexible price model of section 2, current and anticipated changes
in exogenous variables contribute to the system's dynamics. They do so by
alteringandover time, thus changing the long—run equilibrium toward which
the economy converges. The process of convergence, however, is a second, intrin-





Equations(3.11) and (3. 12) show that the motion of the system is in fact the sum of
two sources of motion: The (extrinsic) movement in the system's flexible—price
equilibrium and the (intrinsic) adjustment of prices to their current flexible—
price values in response to goods—market disequilibrium.
We now consider an unanticipated, permanent shock to the money supply
occurring at time t0, i.e., a shift in the anticipated path of the money supply
from {mt}to {mt ÷m} .Tohighlight the effects of this shock, we suppose
t=O t=0
that the economy is in full equilibrium before it occurs, with p0 = Asthe
analysis of the flexible—price model showed, both and jump immediately by
the amount m; indeed, the paths of andjump uniformly by that amount.
Because the price of domestic output is predetermined, however, it remains tern—
porarily at p0.As (3.12) shows, the divergence between p0 and raises the rate
of domestic price inflation.
An interesting aspect of the exchange rate's response to a monetary shock is
the possibility that It may "overshoot" its new flexible—price or full equilibrium
level.'2 From (3.9), the initial depreciation eoexceedsor falls short of oas
(3.13) a —4(1+8ay) 0
Intuitively, overshooting arises as follows. Because domestic prices are prede-
termined, the initial depreciation of the currency is a real depreciation that
shifts demand from foreign toward domestic goods. Aggregate demand is stimulated— 28—
furtherthrough a fall in the real interest rate, so output unambiguously rises.
The concomitant increase in the demand for money reduces the initial excess supply
occasioned by the monetary expansion, as does the rise in the overall price level
implied by the currency's depreciation. But if an excess supply of money remains
after these adjustments, the nominal domestic interest rate must fall to preserve
asset—market equilibrium. Since a permanent increase in the level of the money
supply does not affect the depreciation rate in the flexible—price model, (2.1)
and (3.11) imply that the home interest rate can fall only if the currency depre—
cates so far on impact that it is expected to appreciate thereafter toward its
flexible—price value. In contrast, if the increase in output raises money demand
sufficiently to produce excess demand at the initial nominal interest rate, then
overshooting will not occur. The nominal interest rate must rise to clear the
money market in this case, and the exchange rate will be expected to depreciate
thereafter toward Its long—run level .Thisis the "undershooting" case, In
which the impact depreciation of the currency falls short of the depreciation that
would take place in a flexible—price economy.
The adjustment of the system after the shock at time t =0is determined endo-
genously through the workings of the price—adjustment rule (3.2). p rises gra-
dually towardand e may fall or rise toward adependingon whether over— or
undershooting has occurred. The real rate of interest rises over time as the
terms of trade return to the initial level and output falls. Monetary policy is
neutral in the long run but sluggish price adjustment gives it the power to alter
output and relative prices in the short run. In the sticky—price setting, there-
fore, deviations from purchasing power parity may result both from real disturban-
ces and, temporarily, from monetary shocks.
We now consider an anticipated permanent increase in the future money stock
announced at time t =0.It is assumed, as in section 2.2, that the money supply,— 29—
previouslyexpected to be constant at rn, is now expected to increase by the amount
m at t=T.Allelseremains fixed.If the economy is initially at long—run
equilibrium with p0 ,(3.9) and(3.10) imply that its subsequent path is
14
[c —pq(i+ey)]exp(—T/x) —e (3. )e
-
[(1-c)+(1+Oy)+ exp t
(x+exp[(t—T)/XJm—ciz/4 — (0t < T) + — — _* / x+Em— — p )T
(3.15) Pt =—exp(—T/X)imexp(—Oct)
(÷exp[(t—T)/X]m+ (1 —ci)/4 (0 t < T)
(tT).
The announcement causes both the exchange rate and nominal interest rate to jump
upward, with the impact depreciation smaller than in the case of an unanticipated
occurrence of the same shock. The domestic-goods price is sticky and cannot jump
in response to the announcement, but it begins to rise gradually in response to a
rise in output and inflationary expectations. As in the flexible—price model,
neither the exchange rate nor the price of domestic goods jumps at time T when
the anticipated increase in money occurs. Rather, the nominal interest rate falls
at T as the rate of currency depreciation falls.In the overshooting case, the
exchange rate will abruptly begin to appreciate at T, but without a discrete
change in its level.
Note that goods—market disequilibrium remains even after the increase in money
has taken place. Because the price level is sluggish, nominal prices cannot
adjust fully to the anticipated disturbance by time T, as they did In the
flexible—price case. Therefore, the real effects of anticipated money persist
until the flexible—price equilibrium is asymptotically attained.
A very useful diagrammatic rendition of the model is possible under the assump—— 30 —
tionthat x, z, and p' are expected to remain constant at x, z, and 5' forever.
Because =x—ctz/4— and=x+(1—ct)z/are then constant, the diagram
highlights the intrinsic dynamics of the system. As we shall see, however, it is
also possible to use the diagram to analyze the effects of anticipated shocks.
(An alternative diagram, in which real balances and the terms of trade appear on
the axes, is sometimes used. See, e.g., Buiter and Miller, 1982.)
Equations (3.6) and (3.7) may be transformed to yield
(3.16)et =[(1GI)+p(1+Gy)J(et —÷k (ps- —
(3.17);
=[(1—ct)+ *4(i + Or') + X04]
(et —_ +
[a — + Oay)
—
Pt —
Thephase diagram for this system in the case
(3. 18)0 < a —p4(1+ Oy) < X64
is shown in figure 3.1.13 The long—run equilibrium A is a saddle point. A
unique path SS converges to that stationary position, and all other paths diverge
explosively.
To interpret the diagram, consider the general solution to (3.16) and (3.17):




(3.20) Pt —= k1exp(t/X)+ k2exp(—O4t)
The trajectory emanating from any point in the phase plane can be obtained by
appropriate choice of the arbitrary initial conditions k1 and k2 .Becausethe
exponential exp(t/A) induces explosive behavior, initial conditions with k1 0
necessarily place the economy on one of the divergent paths. The saddle—path con-
dition k1 =0,in contrast, places the economy on the convergent trajectory SS.














lastunanticipated shock and by the additional initial condition k2=
p0
— .By
setting k1 =0in (3.19) and (3.20), we see that the equation for the saddle path
SS is
321 ---[(1-a)+(1+Oo')+XOI - ( Pt P - [a—(1+0)] et e
SS slopes downward or upward according to condition (3.13).
Figure 3.2 illustrates the effects of a permanent, unanticipated fiscal expan—
Sian when (3.18) holds. Initially, the system is at the long—run equilibrium
A. The shift in policy moves the system's long—run equilibrium to the new point
A which, as (3.21) shows, is to the left of the original saddle path SS. Because
the output price p cannot jump, the instantaneous post—disturbance equilibrium is
at the point Bon the new convergent path SS. Thus, the currency appreciates,
and the terms of trade and output rise. Because the currency is expected to
appreciate further, the nominal Interest rate falls, and because the terms of
trade are expected to rise, the real Interest rate falls. Over time, expectations
are fulfilled: as the economy moves along SStoward its new stationary position,
the domestic currency appreciates, the price of the home good rises, and output
and Interest rates return to their pre—disturbance levels. Note that while (3.18)
implies exchange—rate overshooting in reponse to unanticipated, permanent monetary
shocks, the present example shows that It does not imply overshooting in response
to all shocks.
Although the diagrammatic analysis is predicated on the assumption that the
exogenous variables are expected to remain constant, the apparatus may be
rigorously used to study the effects of anticipated future disturbances (see
Wilson, 1979; Rogoff, 1979; Gray and Turnovsky, 1979; and Bayer and Hodrick,
l982a). Consider again an anticipated, permanent increase m in themoney supply.
The long-run equilibrium after the increase in money is point Ain figure 3.3.






















(3.14)and (3.15). Between 0 and T, that path corresponds to the particular solu-
tion of (3.16) and (3.17) obtained by setting k1 =—k2
=exp(—T/A)min (3.19) and
(3.20). Thus, the economy's motion over that time interval is described by one of
the unstable paths of the system with steady state A, though because (3.14) and
(3.15) incorporate the saddle—path assumption, the economy's path is in no sense a
"bubble" path. After time T, however, the coefficient of exp(t/X) in (3.14) and
(3.15) is 0, and the economy may therefore be regarded as traveling along the con-
vergent path SStoward the long—run equilibrium A. The additional information
that the exchange rate cannot jump discretely at time T leads to the adjustment
path depicted in figure 3.3. When the future disturbance is announced, the
exchange rate jumps immediately to rj(atpoint B), and then rises further to meet
the new convergent path SS precisely at time T. Only one initial exchange rate
o places the economy on a trajectory hitting SSat time T; drj is the equilibrium
exchange rate because it alone is consistent with the absence of infinitely large
expected arbitrage gains along the economy's path.
3.2 Exchange—Rate Dynamics with Contracting and Imperfect Information
The sticky—price assumption of section 3.1 resulted in short—run monetary non—
neutrality and an intrinsic component of exchange—rate dynamics. Here we briefly
discuss the predictions of some stochastic exchange—rate models in which monetary
non—neutrality and intrinsic dynamics arise from other sources. For comparability
with the main references on these models, we switch from the continuous time fra-
mework of previous sections to discrete time.
There are three channels through which a change in the money supply affects
the exchange rate in the models discussed here. First, the exchange rate rises as
other nominal variableè rise in response to an increase in the money supply.
Second, a change in money may affect output or aggregate demand and, by changing
the demand for money, affect the exchange rate. Third, a change in money may— 33—
changethe equilibrium terms of trade or relative price of non—traded goods. As
noted in section 2, part of such a change will be accommodated by the exchange—
rate.
The first two of these channels were present in the sticky—price model of sec-
tion 3.1, and the first channel always dominates the second: an increase in money
raises output (and money demand) only when the exchange rate rises. After its
initial increase, the exchange rate falls or rises toward its long—run level
depending on the sign of (3.13). Different exchange—rate dynamics are obtained by
Flood and Hodrick (1983) in a model with "semi—sticky" prices. In that model,
goods prices are determined simultaneously with the exchange rate and are sticky
only in the sense of being set prior to the time when sales (which are stochastic)
occur and output decisions are made. Unexpectedly high demand is met at the pre-
set prices with an increase in output and a fall in inventories of final goods
held by firms. An unperceived increase in the money supply causes asset—price
movements that lead consumers and firms to the rational but mistaken inference
that there has been a decrease in demand for the domestic good. As a result,
domestic firms set a nominal price of goods that is consistent, given e and
with a lower terms of trade. Because a fall in demand for the domestic good fails
to materialize, the actual quantity demanded at the lower terms of trade is
greater than firms had anticipated. Firms respond both by increasing output and
reducing inventories.
Unlike in the model of section 3.1, the fall in the terms of trade here is
explicitly the result of an optimal choice made by firms with incomplete
information. Further, output responds only to monetary changes that are not fully
perceived as such by firms. As usual, the fall in the terms of trade occurs
partly through a rise in the exchange rate. Although the exchange rate initially
rises in the Flood—Hodrick model as in the model of section 3.1, and may overshoot
its new long-run level, the subsequent dynamics are very different. The fall in— 34—
inventorieseventually causes an increase in the equilibrium terms of trade as
firms re—build their goods stocks; and this increase occurs partly through a fall
in the exchange rate. After its initial rise at the time of the monetary shock,
the exchange rate therefore falls below its new long—run equilibrium level and
then rises monotonically to that level.In the Flood—I-Iodrick setup, the per-
sistent real effects of monetary shocks reflect the intrinsic dynamics implied
by the inventory adjustment process.
The Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977) models of nominal wage contracting are
discussed in an open—economy context by Marston in chapter 20, section 5•14 In
the model presented by Marston, the exchange rate initially rises In response to
an unanticipated permanent increase in money, and subsequently rises or falls to
Its new long-run equilibrium. The intrinsic dynamics are similar to those in the
sticky—price model of section 3.1, but the speed of adjustment to the new long—run
equilibrium now depends on how rapidly wages can move to eliminate labor—market
Imbalance. The degree of wage inertia is in general a function of contract
lengths, Iridexation provisions, and the extent to which contract periods in dif-
ferent sectors of the economy overlap. Taylor (1980), for example, shows how
staggered nominal wage contracts result in a persistent effect of disturbances on
output. Burgstaller (1980), Sachs (1980), Obstfeld (1982), and Calvo (1983) study
dynamic open—economy models assuming sluggish wage adjustment.
Models developed by Lucas (1975) and Barro (1980) ascribe the short—run non—
neutrality of money entirely to incomplete information in decentralized markets:
there is no role for pre—set prices. Koh (1982) extends this setup to the open—
economy. (See also SaidI, 1980; Harris and Purvis, 1981; Stockman and Koh, 1982;
and Kiinbrough, 1983.) In contrast to the other models discussed above, Koh's
model predicts that the exchange rate may either rise or fall initially in
response to an unperceived permanent increase in the money supply. There are— 35—
severalpossible post—disturbance adjustment paths that reflect an intrinsic dyna-
mic process powered by external asset accumulation.
To illustrate these results, we consider an "island" model of the type ana-
lyzed by Lucas and Barro. Each island in the small domestic economy can exchange
a "traded" good with other islands in the domestic economy or with the outside
world. This international good can be exchanged for domesticmoney or for an
asset denominated in foreign currency. In addition, there is on each island a
non—traded good that cannot be exchanged either with other islands or the outside
world. Demand for and supply of the traded good T and the non—traded good Non
each island z are functions of the relative price of the nontraded good on
island z, N(Z) —pT;the stock of foreign assets held on island z, f(z); and (as
in Barro, 1980) a wealth term in unperceived nominal money, m(z) —m,where
nit(z) is money held on island z at time t and mt is the expected per—island
value of the aggregate domestic money stock, conditional on information available
at time t on island z. These demand and supply functions are written as
(3.22) y'1(z) =y(p(z) —p)+ y f(z) + y (mt(z) —mt) + (z)
(3.23) y'1(z) =4 (p(z)
— +4ft(z)+ (mt(z) —mt)+ (z)
(1d,s). The parameters '4,'4, '4, 8,B, and are positive, while
y, y, 8,8, andI3 are negative. AssumethatVz) and 5(z) areidentically
zero. v5(z) and cd(z) are then random disturbances to the supply of traded goods
and the demand for non—traded goods on island z.
Because money, like the foreign asset and the international good, can be
traded across islands, there is an economy—wide money market in whichaggregate
money demand must equal the aggregate money supply. Let N, Ns and Ts be
averages of all island—specific values of the corresponding prices and supplies.
The money—market equilibrium condition Is similar to (2.3), with A =0for
simplicity:— 36—
(3.24) mt —ap(1—a)p =ftL,S +(fl —
Itis also necessary for equilibrium that the demand for and supply of the non—
traded good be equal on each Individual island.
The exchange rate is given by
T T*
(3.25) et Pt —Pt
T*
where pis the exogenous foreign price of the traded good. Let Em and f denote
the averages of m and f(z) over all islands, and define — and.E
— .Then(3.22) —(3.25)and the goods—market equilibrium conditions imply
s d (3.26) et tnt — (1—a÷ —





When consumers observe two prices ——theexchange rate (or price of traded
goods) and the price of non—traded goods on their own Island ——theyare unable to
infer the precise realized values of the three random variables m, v, and
Since the coefficient on unperceived money m —Emmay be of either sign and may
be arbitrarily large, an Increase In m accompanied by a smaller increase in Em can
either increase or decrease the exchange rate initially)5
The subsequent path of the exchange rate depends on the adjustment of the net
stock of foreign assets in the economy, f. Because external assets adjust gra-
dually, monetary shocks will have persistent real effects. It can be shown that
an increase in ni coupled with a smaller increase inEm raises Td and lowers
Ts in each island. The resulting trade deficit implies a reduction innext
period's stock of foreign assets, and this reduction affects the exchange rate in
subsequent periods. The role of foreign asset accumulation in exchange—rate dyna-
mics has received considerable attention in the literature, and this is the sub-
ject to which we now turn.'6— 37—
4.Portfolio Balance, Wealth, and the Exchange Rate
The portfolio—balance approach introduces private wealth as an explicit deter-
minant of the demands for both money and goods.17 Stocks of external assets and
domestic capital are predetermined variables that influence the rate at which new
wealth is accumulated through current—account surpluses and investment; and
changes in wealth, in turn, move the economy's short—run equilibrium over time.
The introduction of wealth thus adds an intrinsic component to the economy's dyna-
mics. In a rational—expectations context, the overall dynamics of the system will
result from foreseen changes in exogenous variables as well as from the adjustment
of external claims and capital to the long—run levels desired by firms and
individuals. We simplify this section's discussion of the portfolio approach by
assumingperfect price flexibility throughout.
Dynamic portfolio—balance models of exchange rate determination spring from
two distinct sources in the closed—economy macro—dynamic literature. The first
sourceis the work on inflation and growth exemplified by models of Tobin (1965)
arid Foley and Sidrauski (1970). The second source is the work of Blinder and
Solow (1973) and others on the long—run effects of policies in models where the
government's budget constraint is taken into account.
Fixed exchange rates were assumed in the seminal studies of Branson (1974),
Dornbusch (1975), and Frerikel and Rodriguez (1975), which applied the dynamic
portfolio approach to the open economy. With the monetary base endogenous, asset
markets adjusted to disturbances in part through stock—shift capital flows ——
instantaneousprivate portfolio shifts accommodated by the central bank's
willingness to trade foreign bonds for money at the posted exchange rate. As
wealth evolved over time through investment and external saving, asequence of
short—run portfolio equilibria was traced out, implying a path for the balance
of payments.— 38—
Thebasic approach was easily applied to the study of floating exchange rates,
as the papers of Dornbusch (1976c), Kouri (1976), and Calvo and Rodriguez (1977)
demonstrated. The nominal money supply could no longer change over time to ensure
continuous equilibrium as wealth changed, but the exchange rate did so, altering
both the real money stock and, through Its effect on expectations, the relative
real yields on domestic and foreign assets.
4.1 Foreign Bonds in a Portfolio—Balance Model
The simplest possible model, due in its essentials to Kouri (1976), is used to
develop the main elements of the portfolio approach. We consider a world in which
a single composite consumption good is available and examine a small economy whose
residents may hold wealth in the form of domestic fiat money or bonds denominated
in foreign currency and paying the fixed world interest rate r*.lB Foreigners do
not hold domestic money, and because the central bank does not intervene in the
foreign—exchange market, all net intertemporal trade between the home country and
the rest of the world is accomplished through the private exchange of goods for
foreign bonds.
On the assumption that the foreign—currency price P of the single consumption
good is fixed and equal to 1, the domestic price level P may be identified with
the exchange rate E and the domestic price inflation rate itwiththe proportional
S
rate of increase of E. Output is perishable, with its home supply exogenous and
equal to Y. When domestic investment is introduced explicitly below, home output
of the consumption good will become an endogenous variable and the menu of
available assets will expand by one.
The focus on external asset accumulation and wealth calls for a careful
description of individuals' lifetime consumption possibilities. For simplicity,
we assume throughout that an economy is inhabited by a single, representative— 39—
agent.The typical individual's lifetime budget constraint limits the real pre-
sent value of planned expenditure to total real wealth V, where wealth includes
the present value of expected future output plus transfers from the government.
Let M denote nominal money holdings, F the foreign—currency (and, because P =1,
real) value of external claims, and T real transfers. If an infinite planning
horizon is assumed, the lifetime budget constraint takes the form:
(4.1) f[c5 +(r*+ir5)(M5/P9)] exp {_r*(s_t)] ds
=(Mt/Pt)+Ft+f(Y5+T8)exp [_r*(s_t)] dsVt.
Constraint (4.1) reflects an expenditure concept that includes both spending on
the consumption good and spending on the services of real balances, where the
* lattergood is valued at the opportunity cost of holding money, r +i.
ConsumptionC is assumed to be an increasing function of both current dispo-
sable income yd and wealth V,'9
(4.2) Ct =C(Y,Vt), 1 > Cd °'Cv
> 0.
Disposable income is the sum of current output, real interest payments on foreign
bond holdings, lump—sum transfers from the government, and real capital gains on
asset holdings. Thus, yd =Y+r*F+ T —ir(M/P),where n(M/P) is the inflation
tax.
Instantaneous equilibrium in asset markets requires that the demand for real
money balances equal the supply. The fraction of real wealth allocated to real
money holdings is assumed to be a positive declining function L(r*+t) of the nomi-
nal interest rate.In equilibrium, therefore,
(4.3) Mt/Pt =L(r*+ ir)V, L'< 0.— 40—
If'idenotesthe (positive) growth rate of the nominal money supply, HIM, and &




Themodel is closed by specification of the government's flow budget constraint.
Real government consumption C and transfer payments must be financed through
money creation; there is no government—issued interest—bearing debt.2° This
implies a public—sector finance constraint of the form
(4.5) Tt + t =Mt/Pt
=
Becausethe level of real balances L Is an endogenous variable, the government
cannot choose the paths of ii, T, and G independently while continuously satisfying
(4.5). The analysis therefore takes iandT to be the variables controlled by the
government and assumes that government consumption adjusts passively according to
the equation CtUtt —Tt.
We now describe how expectations and asset stocks evolve over time in
equilibrium.
The law of motion for real balances £ is derived by combining equilibrium con-
ditions (4.3) and (4.4) to obtain the relation
(4.6) L[r* + t (t/Lt)] £tIVt=i/{i+ [(F+'1t+f)/Lt]}.
In (4.6), 't= exp[_r*(s_t)] ds and =fT5exp [_r*(s_t)]ds.
Inversion of (4.6) yields
(4.7) t ={r*+ t —[t/(Ft+'t+ft)]}&t,$1<0.
is a decreasing function because a higher portfolio share will be willingly
allocated to money only if the Inflation rate falls; and, given the monetary
growth rate ,afall In inflation implies more rapid growth of real balances.— 41—
Thesystem's second differential equation describes the notion of the foreign
asset stock F. Because there is no domestic investment in the present model, the
difference between disposable income and consumption equals the change in holdings
of real money and real foreign bonds:
(4.8) t + F = — C=+r*Ft ÷Tt— — C
Equations (4.4) and (4.8) together give the equilibrium current—account balance F as
(4.9) Yt÷rF
—C(Yt+r*Ft+Tt+&t_pt&t,Lt+Ft+Yt+Tt) + Tt —
Thepublic—sector budget constraint (4.5) implies that the current account equals
the difference between national income, Y + r*F, and national absorption, C + G.
If one is willing to consider a global linearization of the system consisting
of (4.7) and (4.9) it is possible to study the economy's response to various
expected trajectories for the forcing variable ',T,and Y (see, e.g., Barro,
1978; Flood, 1979; Rodriguez, 1980; Boyer and Hodrick, 1982b; and Mussa, 1984).
We assume instead that these variables are constant at levels ji,T,and Y except
for permanent unanticipated jumps; and we therefore focus on the intrinsic com-
ponent of the system's dynamics fueled by the adjustment of foreign asset stocks
to long—run desired levels. (As in the discussion of section 3.1, however, the
diagram we now develop to illustrate this adjustment process may be used also to
study certain anticipated and transitory shocks.)
By requiring that the exogenous variables follow constant paths, we reduce
(4.7) and (4.9) to an autonomous differential—equation system in £ and F. That
system is assumed to possess a unique stationary point (&,F) at which the growth
rate of real balances 9. and the equilibrium current account F are simultaneously
zero. The linear Taylor approximation to the system around (9,F)is— 42—
(4.10)1t -L/(1-L)
tj (1_Cyd)_CV+[cydL/(1_L)] r*(1_CYd)_CV_[CydL2/(1_L
whereallfunctions are evaluated at long—run equilibrium. The determinant of the




Because the determinant is the product of the system's characteristic roots, the
system must possess a negative root (associated with the predetermined variable F)
and a positive root (associated with the jumping variable L, which varies inver-
sely with E). Thus, the long-run equilibrium (2..,F) is a saddle point.
Stability condition (4.11) requires that equilibrium public plus private
absorption increase faster than income as foreign assets increase. Section 5,
below, shows that side conditions like (4.11) can sometimes be replaced by assump-
tions on preferences in models based on explicit Intertemporal optimization: if a
stationary position exists, the model's Inherent logic will then imply saddle—path
stability. As we shall see, however, there do exist optimizing models with no
well—behaved long-run equilibrium, as well as optimizing models with multiple sta-
tionary points.
Figure 4.1 is the local phase diagram of the system described by equations
(4.7) and (4.9). Differentiation of (4.7) shows that the locus of points along
which £ =0is of slope [F +(Y+T)/r*]I&,which is a positive number If the
stock of foreign claims never falls below —(Y +T)/r*.21The slope of the F0
locus depends on the sign of 3FIF [given by the southeast entry of the matrix
In (4.10)]. Figure 4.1 shows the case we will discuss: that In which 3F/3F < 0,
so that the F0 locus slopes downward.22 Note that a9/92., given by the northwest
entry of the matrix in (4.10), is always positive. As usual, the unique saddle
path SS converging to li,ng—run equilibrium at A is the rational—expectations









Asalient feature of figure 4.1 is the positive association between real
balances and foreign assets along the saddle path. This translates into a rela-
tionship between the exchange rate and the current account, for when the current
account is in surplus, the currency depreciates more slowly than its trend
depreciation rate ji.Intuitively,the growing wealth implied by a current
surplus leads to a growing demand for real balances that prevents prices from
rising to the full extent of the cumulative increase in the nominal money supply.
We shall soon see that this surplus—appreciation, deficit—depreciation rela-
tionship, while characterizing the process of convergence to a fixed stationary
state, need no longer hold once anticipated disturbances are considered. The
relationship may break down also when non—monetary wealth can be held in the
form of domestic capital as well as foreign claims.23
Assume now that the economy is initially in long—run equilibrium at point A.
The first experiment to be considered is an unanticipated, permanent increase in
the money stock —adiscontinuous jump in N that leaves the growth rate of money
unchanged. Equilibrium is restored if the currency depreciates immediately in
proportion to the increase in money, leaving real balances at their original level
2. and real wealth at its long—run desired level. Because prices are fully
flexible and the system is homogertous in all nominal variables, a monetary change
of the type considered here has no real effects. In particular, it does not set
into motion the intrinsic dynamics of the economy.24
An unanticipated permanent increase in the money growth rate Ti, in contrast,
can have a real impact on the economy. In other words, money is not superneutral,
as it was in section 2.Figure 4.2 illustrates the effects of this policy shift
when the O locus slopes downward.
As is easily verified, the £O and F=O schedules both shift leftward near the
steady state. While the long—run level of real balances falls unambiguously to







Figure4.2 shows the case in which F> F. When iiisincreased, the currency
depreciates and a current surplus emerges as the economy jumps to point Bon the
new saddle path S'S. Real balances and foreign bonds subsequently rise together
while the economy converges to its new long—run position A'. When F< F, the
increase in iinaturallyoccasions a depreciation coupled with a current
deficit.26
These real effects of a change in monetary growth come from three related
sources, none of which was present in the flexible—price model of section 2.
First, the concomitant increase in inflation reduces real wealth and hence private
consumption by reducing desired real balances. Second, because real transfers T
are held constant, there may be a change In the inflation tax that alters long—run
disposable income. Third, a change in the product hR.resultsin an equal change
in government consumption, by (4.5). If the interest—rate elasticity of money
demand exceeds 1, a rise in i lowers long—run government consumption and the long—
run inflation tax. Because Cd < 1, steady—state foreign assets must rise to
ensure external balance. When money demand is inelastic with respect to the nomi-
nal interest rate, long—run foreign assets may fall.
Figure 4.2 may also be used to analyze an announced future increase in .'.As
we have seen, the path of the economy between the announcement of the policy
change and its implementation is described by an unstable trajectory of the auto-
nomous system defined by (4.7) and (4.9). Further, there can be no discrete
jump in E at the moment i rises. Accordingly, the economy jumps immediately to a
point like B and reaches SSat the moment i.tisincreased,It is noteworthy that
as the economy travels between the momentary equilibrium B and SS, the currency
depreciates at a rate exceeding p even though the current account is in surplus.
The example shows that the surplus—appreciation, deficit—depreciation pattern,
while characterizing the intrinsic component of the systemts dynamics, need not
dominate the response to anticipated exogenous disturbances.— 45—
Non—monetarydisturbances can be studied as well. A permanent, unanticipated
increase in Y leads to a fall Y/r* in long—run external assets but to no change
in long—run real balances &.Accordingly,the currency appreciates in the short
run and a current deficit emerges. Real balances and foreign assets both fall in
the transition to the new stationary state.
4.2 Investment and the Current Account
It was noted above that the presence of domestic investment opportunities may
alterthe simple relation between the exchange rate and the current account
characterizing convergent paths. ney demand depends on wealth in a portfolio
setting, but wealth and foreign assets can move in opposite directions in a model
with capital accumulation, even as the economy converges to a fixed long—run
equilibrium. It therefore becomes possible that a current deficit will be
accompanied by rising real balances and a current surplus by falling real balan-
ces.
We illustrate these possibilities by incorporating investment into the
portfolio—balance model developed above. (See Dornbusch, 1980, and Hodrick, 1980,
for similar models.) The assumption of a single available consumption good is
retained, but it is now assumed that the domestic supply of that good is endoge—
nous and that the economy can produce, in addition, a non-traded investment good.
The production technologies for the consumption and investment goods are described
by constant—returns—to—scale, neo—classical production functions taking capital
and labor as inputs. Because the investment good is not tradable, the output of
the investment sector represents the (gross) capital accumulation of the economy.
Labor is supplied inelastically at the fixed level N.
Claims on domestic capital cannot be held by foreigners, but capital and
foreign bonds are perfect substitutes from the standpoint of home investors.27 Let— 46—
pdenote capital's real rental, the marginal product of capital in the consumption
sector.If is the price of a unit of capital in terms of the consumption good





sothat the rate of physical return on capital plus the rate of capital gain
equals the world bond rate.
On the assumptions that no factor-intensity reversals are possible, that the
economy does not specialize in production, and that the investment good is relati-
vely labor intensive, the Stolper—Satnuelson reasoning allows us to write the
rental p as a declining function of and the real wage u as an increasing func-
tion of PK(see chapter 1, volume 1, by Jones and Neary). Arbitrage condition
(4.12) then becomes a differential equation in the price of capital,
(4.13) =c+ r* —[p(P)/P]
, p<0.
K
The dynamic system in P described by (4.13) is unstable, with a single steady
state at the unique capital price such that e + r* =(K)/K .Therequire-
ment of saddle—path stability allows us to conclude that the price of capital will
always be constant at level and, by implication, that the real rental and wage
will also be constants. These are denoted by p and w, respectively.
Given production possibilities (as summarized by the current capital stock
K), output of the two goods depends on the relative price PK. The supply func—
tioris for the consumption good and the investment good may therefore be written as
QC(PKK) and QI(K, K), respectively. By the Rybczynski theorem, > 0 and
Q'/aK < 0 (chapter 1, volume 1).28— 47—
Threedifferential equations summarize the dynamics of the system. Real net
investment is given by
(4.14) =pKQI(KKt) —KK
External asset accumulation equals the difference between the economy's endowment
of the consumption good and consumption spending, so that
(4.15) = QC(pKKt) + r*Ft —C(Y,Vt) +—
wherenow,
(4.16)Vt = +Ft + (N+ T)Ir*+ Kt
The system's final equation is the analogue of (4.7),
(4.17) t {r* + —[t/(vt—
Thestationary values of asset stocks are denoted by K, F, and £.
Forthe present purpose, it is convenient to work with a representation of the
model that differs from the one given by equations (4.14), (4.15), and (4.17). To
derive this alternative (but equivalent) representation, note that by (4.4), (4.12),
and (4.17), we may write disposable income as Y =üN+ {(/K) —c]PKKt+r*Ft+
T —ttr* (V —£t)÷ {r* —'[&/(v
—£t)J}Z .Similarly,by adding (4.14)




Together,equations (4.17) and (4.18) constitute an autonomous differential—
equation sub—system in real balances L and non—monetary wealth V—L. As before,
equation (4.14) describes the motion of domestic capital; but K does not appear
explicitly in the dynamic sub—system defined by the two other equations.
The alternative representation implies that the economy's evolution does not
depend on levels of capital and foreign claims separately, but only on their sum.
(This would not be true if capital and bonds were imperfect substitutes in port—— 48—
folios.)Thus, saving and equilibrium real balances are determined entirely by V —
alower capital stock, ceteris paribus, implies a higher investment level financed
by an equal deterioration in the current account. What happens when the capital
stock is initially at the stationary level K defined by QI(pK, K) =K? In this
case capital and consumption—goods production remain constant through time, so
that the model reduces to the simpler portfolio model discussed above in section
4.1.
It is easy to derive the phase diagram for the sub—system consisting of (4.17)
and (4.19); indeed, we have already done the work. Note that the system inand
V —£described by (4.17) and (4.19) is identical to the system in £ and F that
equations (4.7) and (4.9) describe when .i, T, and Y are constant. Qualitatively,
the dynamics of the present model can therefore be illustrated by figure 4.1, with
F replaced everywhere by V —
Theintrinsic dynamics of the extended model imply that increasing non—
monetary wealth is accompanied by a rate of currency depreciation that falls short
of the money growth rate i, while decreasing wealth is accompanied by a depre-
ciation rate exceeding ji.But no tight link between the exchange rate and the
current account is implied, and a current deficit, say, may easily be accompanied
by rising real balances. To see this, assume that non—monetary wealth is ini-
tially below its long—run level, that initial capital is lower than K, and that
initial foreign assets exceed F. The stock of foreign claims cannot converge to
its long—run level F unless the current account is in deficit along some portion
of the subsequent transition path. As the diagram shows, however, real balances
(and non—monetary wealth) will rise monotonically along that path, even during
periods in which foreign assets are being run down.
We conclude that when the menu of assets is expanded, the current account, 2
se, mayplayno role in determining exchange—rate behavior along paths converging— 49—
toa fixed long—run equilibrium. The linkage that does emerge is one between the
exchange rate and the evolution of overall national wealth. Whether saving is
external or internal is irrelevant in the present model.— 50—
5.Exchange—Rate Models Based on Individual Intertemporal Optimization
The exchange—rate dynamics highlighted in section 4 were driven by external
asset accumulation and domestic Investment. Central to the analysis of that sec-
tion were the assumed forms of the consumption function and the portfolio—balance
schedule. We now turn to exchange—rate models in which the consumption function
and asset demands are derived explicitly from individual preferences regarding
alternative future expenditure paths. While the broad predictions of section 4
can be replicated in some optimizing models, the results are quite sensitive to
the assumptions one makes about intertemporal tastes.
Models of optimal external borrowing developed by Bardhan (1967), Ramada
(1969), and Bruno (1976) are the forerunners of optimizing exchange—rate models.
While these models were concerned exclusively with real factors, the Introduction
of money yields a theory of exchange—rate dynamics In which the evolution of asset
stocks results from optimal individual choices.
The proper role of money in an optimizing model is a controversial question,
however, and results are sensitive to the way in which money is introduced. Why
should maximizing agents hold money at all when It is dominated, in terms of both
return and risk, by other assets? Below, we will discuss two methods of answering
this question. The first, adopted by Sldrauski (1967) and Brock (1975), assumes
that the level of real balances enters directly into agents' instantaneous utility
functions. Thus, money offers a real "convenience yield" that may induce
agents to hold It. The second device for introducing money, associated with
Clower (1967), assumes that agents must acquire money and hold It for some time
before purchasing consumption goods. In this sequential, "cash—in—advance" setup,
money demand is closely linked to planned future purchases of consumption goods.
It is clear that both approaches to money demand leave us far from a true theory
of why money Is held. Nonetheless, the models discussed below are both tractable— 51—
aridsuggestive. Pending further developments in monetary theory, they represent
the state of the art.3°
5.1 A Small—Country, One—Good Model
We introduce individual optimization explicitly while retaining the assump-
tions and notation of section 4. To simplify, we abstract from domestic invest-
ment throughout this section, although investment could be introduced along the
lines of section 4.2 above. Statements about the current account made below are
predicated on the tacIt assumptIon that the domestIc capital stock Is constant.
If the assumption is relaxed, those statements must be interpreted as applying to
the overall rate of accumulation of non—money assets. (Hodrick, 1982, and
Greenwood, 1983, study versions of the present model. Sachs, 1983b, introduces
Investment Into a related two—country simulation model that includes two consump-
tion goods and an intermediate good.)
A representative agent is now assumed to derive Instantaneous utility IJ(C,&)
from his expenditure on the single consumption good and his holdings of realmoney
balances.31 The consumer (who may also be thought of as a dynastic "family") is
immortal and maximizes his lifetime welfare, W, subject to the lifetime budget
constraint (4.1). It is assumed that W is a time—additive function of future
instantaneous utilities,
(5.1) W({Ct} ,{&.})fexp(—6t)U(C,£t)dt tO t=O o
whereis a constant rate of subjective time preference. (Alternative preference
schemes are discussed later.) Let no be the shadow price of real wealth at time
0. Given (5.1), the first—order conditions for the consumer's problem are
(5.2)U(c, £t)n0exp[(,S_r*)t]
(5.3) u(C, £t)(r*+ lft)fl0exp[(6—r*)t]— 52—
Conditions(5.2) and (5.3) define desired consumption and real balances as func-
tions of the current inflation rate, the world interest rate, time, and r. The
value of o yielding an optimal program from the individual's standpoint is the
unique value that allows the budget constraint (4.1) to hold with equality when
planned consumption and real balances satisfy (5.2) and (5.3) at every point in
the future.
It is instructive to compare the consumption and money demand functions
implied by the constrained maximization of (5.1) with those assumed in section 4.
Closed—form behavioral functions cannot be obtained unless we specify a particular
functional form for the utility function U(C,), so we assume that it is a member
of the constant relative risk aversion family (C ,whereR > 0 and 0
< a < 1. (None of the results obtained below would be qualitatively altered if a
wider class of utility functions was considered.) With this choice of utility
function, (4.1), (5.2), and (5.3) imply that consumption and money demand are
given by





ra(r*+lrt)l_1 (5.5)£ 1—a jC
where it is assumed that _r* +(r*_6)/R < 0 and that the integral in (5.4) con-
verges. (See Obstfeld, 1983, for the solution method.) As in (4.2) and (4.3),
desired consumption and real balances are both increasing functions of wealth V,
while money demand is a declining function of the current nominal interest rate
r* +it.Butin addition, anticipated future inflation generally influences the
demands for goods and assets; current inflation generally affects consumption; and
current disposable income plays no role. An exception arises when R1, so that— 53—
theutility function takes the separable form oin(C) + (1—cz)ln(L). In this spe-
cial case, the consumption function takes the form given by (4.2) (withCd =0)
and the demand for real balances takes the form given by (4.3).
One source of monetary non—neutrality in section 4ts model was the assumption
that government spending was a function of private real balances [see the
discussion following equation (4.5)]. To better understand the possible sources
of non—neutrality in optimizing models, we now depart further from the assumptions
of section 4 and assume that it is the level of transfers, rather than government
consumption, that adjusts passively to changes in inflation—tax revenue. With
this assumption, transfers are given by
(5.6) Tt =t9,t
—Gt
and the path of G is exogenous. Accordingly, changes in 9, can no longer affect an
Important real variable, the portion of national income consumed by the govern-
ment.
To study the economy's perfect foresight equilibrium, we assume initially that
the money growth rate Is a positive constant, i.Logarithmicdifferentiation of
(5.5) shows that
(5.7) +[1_R_11 t +(r-)-[r*
-(c/v)] t V (r*+lrt) R
where C is given by (5.4). Using the definition of V in (4.1) and equation (4.8),
we find that the planned change in wealth, V, is given by r*V —C—(*)9,•
(This relationship also appeared In section 4.2.) Because C + (*)9,= C/
(given the assumed form of the utility function), the first and last terms on the
right—hand side of (5.7) cancel. Equation (4.4) then implies that the equilibrium
inflation rate must satisfy the non—linear differential equation
(5.8) t
(r* + t)[R( —t)+ (6_r*)].
[a(1—R)—11— 54—
Figure5.1 shows the phase diagram for (5.8). The equation has two stationary
points, one stable (at i =_r*)and one unstable (at iT =Ti+ (_r*)/R). Because
the marginal utility of money is always strictly positive, the stationary point at
=—ris not an equilibrium, nor is any point to its left [cf. (5.3)].
Moreover, paths originating to the right of the unstable steady state imply that
inflation explodes in spite of constant "fundamentals. Thus, the economy can
reach its steady state equilibrium (the saddle path) only if inflation jumps imme-
diately to the level
(5.9) =Ti+ (_r*)/R
and remains there forever.
To find the equilibrium exchange rate, note that by (4.4) and (5.9),
(5.10) £ =£texp [(r*_)(s_t)/R]
for s 't.In equilibrium, therefore, the present value of future government
transfer payments is
(5.11)f= f(L —C5)exp[—r*(s—t)]ds —G
t [r + (&-r ) R]
where Ct =fCs exp [_r*(s_t)]ds. When combined, (5.4), (5.5), (5.9), and (5.11)
t
imply that equilibrium real balances are
(5.12) £t =(1-a)[r* + (d_r*)/R ](Ft+ —Ct) a L+r* + (d_r*)/RJ
and that Mt/&t is the eq.uilibrium exchange rate. Equilibrium consumption is































Tointerpret this equilibrium, return to the individual's lifetime budget
constraint. By substituting (4.4) and (5.6) into (4.1) and integrating by parts,
we obtain32
(5.14) fCsexp[_r*(st)]ds = Ft+ Yt —Gt.
t
Because money is a non—traded asset, the present value of domestic private con-
sumption must equal the economy's non—monetary wealth, F + Y, net of the present
value of future public consumption, G. In equilibrium, therefore, current con-
sumption equals a fixed fraction of the present value of planned future consump-
tion.If S =r*,consumption equals "permanent" income, i.e.
cr*(Ft+t_Gt) r* 5C5exp[_r*(s_t)lds,
t
so that C =0.If, however, the consumer is less patient than the rest of the
world.(S > r*), consumption will fall over time; and if he is more patient




Thefirst term on the right—hand side of (5.15) shows that external borrowing and
lending is used to smooth consumption in the face of deviations between disposable
output, Y —G,and its "permanent' level, r*(d?_ó); this term is zero when the
paths of Y and C are flat. The second term on the right—hand side of (5.15)
reflects the discrepancy between the domestic and foreign time preference rates.
If> r*, for example, the current account is perpetually in deficit if the paths
of Y and C are flat.
The intrinsic dynamics of the economy are driven entirely by the discrepancy— 56—
betweenand r*. It is clear from (5.9) that the currency's depreciation rate
exceeds or falls short of i as consumption falls or rises over time (see also
Sachs, l983a).If CS > r*, however, the economy's wealth shrinks to zero asymp-
totically, while if CS < r*, the economy must grow until the small—country assump-
tion is violated. Only if CS =r*does the economy have a well—behaved steady
state of the type assumed in section 4.But that steady state is not unique: in
equilibrium, the private sector chooses the highest constant consumption level
consistent with the economy's non—monetary wealth, given the future path of
government consumption. The currency depreciates at rate iiinthis case [by
(5.9)], regardless of the current account's position. The system has no intrinsic
dynamics.
Any previously unexpected increase in output or fall In government spending ——
whetherpermanent, transitory, or anticipated ——causesa once—and—for—all rise in
consumption and appreciation of the currency. An unanticipated increase in ior
M, similarly, occasions a once—and—for—all depreciation, but does not influence
consumption. The exchange rate response to an anticipated, permanent rise in jior
M, however, is similar to those studied in section 2: the exchange rate takes an
initial upward jump, then rises at an accelerating rate, but does not jump when
the monetary change occurs. It is noteworthy that anticipated monetary shocks
need not be neutral, as (5.4) shows. Only when R =1(so that =0)does
anticipated mone—tary expansion have no impact on consumption and the current
account. In general, the direction of the current—account effect is negative or
positive as consumption and real balances are complements (Uc > 0) or substitutes
(Uc < 0). The model of section 4 also predicted a real dynamic response to an
anticipated monetary shock, but the dynamics of the present system are entirely
extrinsic when CS =r*.
The Intrinsic dynamics caused by a divergence between the world Interest rate
and a constant time-preference rate are inconsistent with the existence of a well—— 57—
behavedsmall—country steady state. Obstfeld (1981) studies a model in which the
time—preference rate cS is endogenous and temporary discrepancies betweenand r*
drive the economy toward a conventional long—run equilibrium with Sr*.
Following Uzawa (1968), Obstfeld assumes that the subjective time preference rate
is a monotonic function 5(U) of contemporaneous utility. The steady state is then
characterized by a unique long—run utility level U satisfying cs(U) =r*.Because
expenditure is rising when 5(U) < r*, 5(U) can converge to r* only if domestic
residents become more impatIent as utilIty Increases, I.e., only If '(U) > 0.
This increasing impatience assumption plays the same role here that stability con-
dition (4.11) played in section 4:it ensures that when the current account is in
surplus, say, consumption increases rapidly enough to eventually drive the surplus
to zero.33
The resulting model is similar to that of section 4.In particular, there is
a unique small—country steady state with positive wealth, and a unique convergent
saddle path along which foreign assets and real money balances rise together.
Further, permanent changes In monetary growth cause movements along the economy's
long-run utility contour U and thus alter the steady—state stock of foreign
claims. This occurs even when the instantaneous utility function is separable in
consumption and real balances (TJc& =0).
5.2 Models with Two Countries and Two Goods
The previous sections of this chapter have studied small countries facing at
least some prices that are determined outside the economy. We now turn to models
of the world economy in which all prices are endogenously determined. As in sec-
tions 2 and 3, it is assumed that two distinct consumption goods are available.
Lucas? (1982) model is a useful benchmark because there can be no inter—
country wealth redistribution and all goods are traded. In addition, the— 58—
"cash—in—advance"framework utilized in that model yields monetary equilibrium
conditions that reduce to a simple quantity theory.
Consider a world of two countries, two goods, and two monies. All consumers
in the world economy have identical tastes, and, as in section 5.1, are risk—
averse and infinitely lived. A resident of the home country receives an exogenous
stochastic endowment, Y, of a non—storable "home good" that can be traded with
zero transport costs; a resident of the foreign country receives an exogenous
stochastic endowment Y of a "foreign good" that can also be traded costlessly.
The money supplies of each country, M and M*, are determined exogenously by the
respective governments. Monetary growth rates are stochastic: M increases via
lump—sum transfer payments to domestic residents at the beginning of each
period, and M* increases via lump—sumtransfersto foreign residents at the
beginning of each period. Output levels and the growth rates of the two
money supplies follow a joint first—order Markov process.
Let C and C* denote consumption levels of the home and foreign goods.
Consumers maximize the welfare criterion
(5.16) w({c}0 ,{c}0)_{ !0tu(c, c)}, 0 < 1,
where is an expected value conditional on t =0InformatIon, is a
constant subjective discount factor, and U is bounded. The maximization is
subject to a budget constraint and to cash—in—advance constraints that
provide an alternative to placing money directly into the instantaneous utility
function. A typical consumer begins each trading "period" with a portfolio of
assets that can include: domestic money, foreign money, claims to delivery of
either money in any future period, and claims to shares of the nominal proceeds
from future sales of either good (equities).
The sequence of events within each period is as follows. First, realized
values of the stochastic endowments are revealed and the consumer receives a— 59—
transferpayment of his country's money. After observing all current—period pri-
ces (including P, the home—currency price of the home good, and P, the foreign—
currency price of the foreign good), the consumer visits an asset market in which
monies and the other available assets are traded. Finally, the consumer visits a
goods market where the two monies are used to purchase the consumption goods and
endowments are sold. Only money held at the close of the current period's asset
tradingmay be used to purchase current consumption. Money earned through the
sale of endowments cannot be used in the same period, and thus enters the
followingperiod's pre—trade portfolio. Further, it is assumed that all goods—
market transactions involve the seller's money, implying that a domestic consumer
receives PY units of domestic money in exchange for his endowment Y.(Helpman and
Razin, 1981, use a one—good framework to compare the dynamics of exchange rates
when buyers' rather than sellers' currencies are used in transactions.) The




whereMd and M*d denote the quantities of the domestic and foreign monies that the
consumer holds at the close of asset trading.
Although all consumers have the same tastes, the equilibrium of the model
depends on the initial di9tribution of wealth. Lucas investigates a perfectly
pooled, stationary equilibrium in which all consumers have the same wealth.
Because tastes are identical and markets are complete, all choose the same portfolio
and all consume the per capita world endowment of each good. As section 5.1
showed, however, this perfectly—pooled equilibrium, while easy to analyze, need
never be attained when the domestic and foreign time preference rates are fixed
constants.
Lucas assumes that monetary policies are such that nominal interest rates are— 60—
strictlypositive. Because consumers would forego interest payments by holding




wherequantities are now expressed in world per—capita terms. The necessary con-
ditions for utility maximization include the standard requirement that the margi-
nal rate of substitution between domestic and foreign goods equal their relative
price:
(5.21)Pt/EtPt =Uc(Yt,Y)/Uc*(Yt,Y).
Together, (5.19)—(5.21) Imply the exchange—rate equation
(5.22) E (Mt/M)(Y/Yt)[uc*(Yt,Y)/uc(Yt,Y)J.
Using (5.22) and the joint probability distribution for the exogenous variables Y,
y* M, and M*, one can derive the probability distribution of the exchange rate.
This solution has several important characteristics. First, both changes
in money supplies and changes In outputs of goods affect the exchange rate.
Changes in tastes for goods (changes in the marginal rate of substitution
function) also move the exchange rate. An Increase in the output of the domestic
good causes a fall in E, unless rises with an elasticity greater than one
when Y rises. The latter possibility would correspond to the usual condition for
immiserizing growth, but iminiserization can never occur here because the assumed
perfect pooling prevents any agentt s utility from falling when one country's
endowment rises. The exchange rate is affected both by factors emphasized in the— 61—
monetaryapproach to exchange rates and by factors emphasized in the elasticities
approach.
Second, only current values of money supplies and outputs affect the exchange
rate, even though prices of claims to future deliveries of goods or monies depend
on the probability distributions of future money supplies and outputs. In a
sense, therefore, the exchange rate is not really an "asset price" in this model,
although the prices of claims clearly are. This characteristic of the model is
not surprising given (a) the fixed velocity of money, (b) the intertemporally
separable utility function that limits substitution over time in the goods market
and prevents future or past levels of output from affecting the current marginal
rate of substitution in equilibrium, and (c) the absence of real investment oppor-
tunities. (Barro and King, 1983, discuss the roles of assumptions (b) and (c)
in a closed—economy equilibrium.) These features yield a model resembling that
of section 2 in the special case A =a0. The condition A =0has an exact ana-
logue in the present setup because velocity is fixed. But consumption demands do
respond to intertemporal relative prices here, so the condition a =0has no coun-
terpart. Rather, the insensitivity of the terms of trade to future real distur-
bances is a characteristic of the model's equilibrium.
Third (although Lucas does not discuss this), the volatility of exchange rates
and price levels can differ in the model. A higher realized value of domestic
output has an exchange—rate effect given by
.±!-=—[i+CC*
—
Ucc*Uc)1 (5.23) dyt UU*
(where small letters, as always, denote logs). P falls in proportion to the rise
in Y.If demand is sufficiently elastic that (5.23) is negative, then E and P
both fall in response to an increase in Y, and the percentage change in E is
smaller than that in P. If (5.23) is positive (the inimiserizing—growth case),
then E rises while P falls, and if demand is so inelastic that (5.23) exceeds— 62—
unity,then the percentage change in E exceeds the percentage change in P.In
this last case, real disturbances cause the exchange rate to have greater volati-
lity than the price level.
The result that the exchange rate is unaffected by the probability distribu-
tion of future money supplies and outputs is eliminated if the model is altered so
that velocity is variable. In the model of Stockman (1980), velocity is variable
because households, when they visit asset markets, do not observe the nominal pri-
ces that they will subsequently face in the goods market. In Lucas' model, posi-
tive nominal interest rates lead households to leave the asset market with just
enough money to finance planned consumption (and never more, since that would
involve sacrificing interest): (5.17) and (5.18) hold as equalities, and aggrega-
tion yields (5.19) and (5.20) in equilibrium. But if goods prices are uncertain
when households choose their portfolios, they must trade off foregone interest
against the utility cost of the consumption foregone In the event that they have
insufficient cash to finance desired consumption. This results in a
"precautionary" demand for money as well as a "transactions" demand. Because
velocities depend on interest rates, constraints (5.17) and (5.18) are not
necessarily binding in equilibrium.
Consider a model in which households visit the goods—market at the beginning
of each period and the asset market at the end of each period, as in Stockman
(1980).The sequence of events now requires households to use money obtained in
period t—1, plus transfer payments at the beginning of period t, to buy goods in
period t. The prices of goods in period t, however, are uncertain when port-
folios are allocated among assets in period t—1. Suppose also that the only
assets available are the two monies and two one—period nominal bonds, B and F,
which pay 1 + r and 1 + r* units of domestic and foreign currency (respectively)
after a period. The limited menu of assets implies that it is no longer feasible— 63—
toperfectly pool risk and that the current account of the balance of payments is
no longer identically zero, as in Lucas' model.
To simplify the analysis, we now assume that the representative agent's




subject to the budget constraint








(5.26)Mt_i + PtTt ) EtM_i )EP*C*,
initial conditions on asset stocks, and terminal conditions preventing debt at
time tH.A foreign representative household solves a similar problem but with
income EP*Y* from selling the foreign good (instead of PY) and transfer payments
EP*T* from the foreign government (instead of PT). Domestic and foreign outputs,
Y and Y, and money supplies, M and 14*, are stochastic. Equilibrium requires that
markets for all goods and assets clear.
The model can be solved by working backwards from time t =H.The necessary
conditions for the optimization problem and the equilibrium conditions can be used
to obtain the expression
(5.27)Et =[U*(C+1,c+1)/P÷1] / [ucct+i,c+l)/p+l] (t<H),
where C and Cc are now the equilibrium levels of consumption in the domestic
country (which depend on the international distribution of wealth). While it is
not possible to obtain a simple reduced—form expression for the exchange rate in
the general case, (5.27) restricts the relation between the exchange rate and— 64—
otherendogenous variables in a manner similar to consumption—based models of
asset pricing (Hansen and Singleton, 1983). This restriction does not depend
heavily on the set of assets available to households. Svensson (1983), for
example, obtains a similar result in a modified version of Lucas' model that per-
mits variable velocities of money. As in the model of section 2, with A > 0 and
a > 0, anticipated future outputs and money supplies affect the exchange rate:
(5.27) relates Et to the probability distributions of and
Money is neutral in this model if nominal transfers are distributed in propor-
tion to initial net nominal asset stocks.34 But money is not superneutral because
inflation in either currency acts as a tax on goods purchased with that currency.
Thus, anticipated inflation affects the terms of trade and so the exchange rate.
If rates of time preference differ across countries, the model has no steady
state in which all agents have positive wealth and consumption. Helpman and Razin
(1982), assuming perfect foresight and an infinite horizon, discuss the exchange
rate changes that occur in this case as wealth is redistributed across countries.
The results are very similar to those derived in the model of section 5.1.
5.3 The Role of Non—traded Goods
The previous sections of this chapter have focused mainly on models in which
all goods are traded. But the exchange—rate effects of disturbances in the market
for non—traded goods differ from those of disturbances in markets for traded
goods. In all the models we have considered, an increase in domestic output
raises the demand for money and tends to reduce all nominal prices including E.
As we have seen, however, the reduction in E is mitigated or reversed if the rise
in domestic output causes a fall in the terms of trade. Lucas' model implies that
the exchange rate falls unless the condition for iminiserizing growth is net. In
contrast, the exchange-rate effect of an increase in the supply of non—tradables— 65—
dependson the parameters of the demand for money. This will be illustrated by a
two—country, finite—horizon model with a single traded good and a non—traded good
in each country.
Assume that a representative domestic household maximizes
TH NH H H t
(5.28)w({c}
,{c} ,{} ) =E { U(c, C, L)}
t=O tO t=O 0 t=O
where cT and denote consumptions of traded and non—traded goods and real
balances L are defined as nominal money M deflated by a price index II.The latter
is a weighted average of the money prices of traded and non—traded goods, PT and
Maximization of (5.28) is subject to initial and terminal conditions35 and
budget constraints of the form,
(5.29)P(Y'—C) + P(Y—C) + P(B...i— PB) + Mti+ PT —
M=0.
Above, and are endowments of traded and nontraded goods; Bt...1 is the number
of real bonds (claims to one unit of the traded good delivered at date t)
purchased at date t—1 at price P_1; Mi denotes nominal money held before the
period t transfer payment of money, PT; and M is the nominal money holding
chosen by the household at date t. There is a similar maximization problem for
the representative foreign household. (Foreign variables are marked with an
asterisk.) We assume that rates of time preference are constant and equal in the
two countries and that U and U are separable in their three arguments. Implicit
in (5.29) is the assumption that national monies are not traded between countries.
The properties of the model can be analyzed by working backwards from the
final period.
Equilibrium conditions require that the world market for tradables clear;
that the two markets for non—tradables clear; and that all asset markets clear.
These conditions can be combined with the necessary conditions for utility maximi-
zation to show the effect of changes in traded and non—traded outputs on the final— 66—
period'sexchange rate. Abstracting from any changes in money supplies or foreign
output of either good, we can write
HT N
(5.30) ER =g ,Y .
LetlI and 2 be the partial derivatives of the price index II =rI(PTPN)let
J' be the derivative of J(.) =U (.),anddefine
n2pN pM K —[u+ uu]/[uL(1 — ) —
%..._j
Thepartial derivatives of the function appearing in (5.30) are




Since It is a .price index, it is homogeneous of degree one in and PN, so the
denominator of K is positive. Because J' < 0 and (as is easily verified)
+ 2 K > 0, g is negative. An increase in thus causes an appreciation of
the domestic currency. But the sign of g depends on the sign of the term
U + U2.. Denote the elasticity of the marginal utility of money by
X(MUuII1U). Then an increase in the output of the non—traded good lowers
(raises) the exchange rate, E, as x>< —1.If the marginal utility of money is
elastic, then an increase in causes the domestic currency to appreciate, just
as an increase in does. But if the marginal utility of money is inelastic,
then an increase in depreciates the domestic currency.36
This result illustrates the different rules for obtaining a probability
distribution on the exchange rate from the probability densities on outputs of
traded and non—traded goods. Although the specific rule derived above applies— 67—
onlyto the final period of the model, a recursive solution of the model shows
how the dynamics of exchange rate changes over time are affected differently by
disturbances in the two sectors. To conserve space, we discuss here the backward
recursion in the intermediate case in which x is constant and equal to —1.
The optimization problem of the representative domestic household in an (H+1)—
period model takes the form of maximizing
(5.33)U(c,C, £ + EV(M, Bt, H —t)
subject to (5.29), where V is the value function or indirect utility function that
shows the maximized value of utility from periods t + 1 through H. Let t be the
time—t shadow value of a unit of domestic money. Standard techniques can be used
to obtain the necessary conditions,
UCT UCNU& 1 T (5.34) t =
Similarconditions are obtained for the analogous maximization problem in the
foreign country.
Ifthe elasticity of the marginal utility of money is one, then njMH
÷ EH_l(1/MH) and t is independent of the output of norrtraded goods
for all t (as long as the output of non—traded goods in t does not affect
)fors > 0, i.e. as long as it does not signal future changes in the money
t+
supply ——apossibility from which we abstract in this discussion). Since
T T *T* *T* =






canbe used to solve for pBand BH_1. The important property of the solution
(used below) is that P8 and B are functions of and pT* (as well as of ii andTi*)but— 68—
* *—1
not (at least directly) functions of yN or Y. Let J ()= LJCT().Theequa—
t ions
.36) = +pB Bt yT* —J*(*pT*)=
Bt_l
—PBt,
allow us to define the functions
(5.37)pT =h(B ,, i*, yT,yT* H—t), pT* =h*(B ,, y*, yT,yT* H—t).
t t—1 t t t t t t—1 t t t t
Then (5.35) and (5.37) constitute a system of four equations that can be solved
for B, B, pT, and pT* as functions of yT, yT*ii, and n*. But it was already
demonstrated that n and fl are independent of current and expected future outputs.
Thus the exchange rate EpT/pT* depends on (current) outputs of traded goods
in each country, but is independent of the outputs of non—traded goods when x =—1.
By varying x, one can change the rule that translates the dynamics of the output
of both traded and non—traded goods into the dynamics of the exchange rate. The
probability distribution on the exchange rate can be independent of the probabi-
lity distribution on outputs of non—traded goods, as when x—1, or (as in the
analysis of t =H)the probability distribution induced on the exchange rate can
respond in similar or in very different ways to the probability distributions on
outputs of traded and non—traded goods.
This result that an increase in output of non—traded goods can push the value
of the domestic currency upward or downward should not be surprising even if the
precise condition was not initially obvious. On the one hand, an increase in yN
reduces pN and, for any given demand for money, requires a higher exchange rate to
keep a weighted average of N and pT fixed, as required for money—market
equilibrium. On the other hand, an increase in yN raises aggregate output at the
initial relative price and, given pN, raises the demand for money and requires a
lower exchange rate. The relative strengths of these effects turn on the elasti-
city of the marginal utility of money.— 69—
6.Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed a variety of dynamic exchange—rate models. These
models have been developed to explain certain facts about floating rates,
but they have other testable implications that can, perhaps be used in the future
to further limit the set of models that are consistent with the data. Existing
empirical research on the models is inconclusive, however.
A common feature of all the models we have discussed is the assumption of
rational expectations: individuals know the structure of the economy, and use all
available information to make optimal forecasts of future variables. Most of the
models reviewed can be analyzed under alternative expectational assumptions, as In
Kouri (1976). But while the informational requirements of the ratioral—
expectations hypothesis may appear extreme, we see two principal reasons for
basing exchange—rate models on the assumption of rationality. First, the
assumption yields results that arise entirely from the inherent logic of a model,
not from arbitrary expectation—formation mechanisms that have been grafted onto
it. Second, the assumption is probably much closer to the truth than simple
alternatives like "static" or "adaptive" expectations. Exchange rates clearly do
respond to anticipated future events, and while the rationality hypothesis may be
incorrect in a literal sense, the qualitative correctness of its implications is
difficult to deny. As the chapter has illustrated, expectations play a key role
in exchange—rate determination, and little can be said about short— and medium—run
exchange rate behavior unless some stand on the process generating expectations is
taken. It is unfortunate, therefore, that formal empirical tests are unlikely to
provide decisive evidence for or against rational expectations. As Levich argues
in chapter 18, any test of rationality is a joint test of rationality and an
underlying exchange—rate model which may itself be inappropriate.— 70—
Theadditional assumption of saddle—path stability was invoked repeatedly in
the models studied above. That assumption requires more than just the efficient
forecasting of future prices. There must also be market forces that prevent the
emergence of self—fulfilling speculative bubbles, so that the exchange rate is
tied to Its fundamental determinants. Several simple theoretical models show how
bubbles can be ruled out through considerations of interternporal arbitrage or
possible government interventions (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983). Casual
empiricism reinforces these theoretical results, for it suggests that protracted
bubbles have not been a feature of the recent experience with floating rates.
Unfortunately, Identification problems similar to those Involved in testing
rational expectations plague any attempt to detect speculative bubbles in actual
data.
The question of which models and types of Implications will be most useful in
future attempts to understand exchange rates is open, and leads to deep philo-
sophical and statistical questions that we will not try to resolve here.
Nonetheless, it seems likely to us that as more data become available, progress
will be made in serious attempts to develop and test new Implications of models
similar to those discussed above.— 71—
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1.The economy is small in the sense that it faces a given foreign interest rate
and a given foreign price of Imports. However, the economy faces a downward—
sloping demand curve for its export good. An alternative assumption, which yields
a similar model, is that the economy produces both a traded good priced in the
world market and a non—traded good priced at home (Dornbusch, 1976a). Sections 3
and 5 below study models with non—traded goods.
2.A number of recent econometric studies reject this hypothesis (see chapter 18
by Levich). No alternative model of nominal interest differentials has received
much statistical support, however, so it seems reasonable to entertain the perfect
substitution hypothesis as a close empirical approximation for some applications.
3. This assumption implies very strong restrictions on the form of any underlying
optimization problem, as it severely limits the allowable substitutions between
goods at different points in time. Note that the domestic real interest rate
defined here can differ from the world real interest rate r* —*
4.Sargent and Wallace (1973) proposed this convention for monetary perfect—
foresight models. While the exclusion of bubbles typically results in a unique
equilibrium (as in the present case), there exist "badly—behaved" models with
multiple convergent equilibrium paths. (See Calvo, 1979, for an example.) Such
models possess multiple rational—expectations equilibria.— 72—
5.Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), building on work by Brock (1975), describe con-
ditions under which the saddle path can be identified as the unique equilibrium
path in an economy of infinitely—lived maximizing agents similar to the one
studied in section 5.1 below.
6.It can be verified that if r* and p rise permanently by equal amounts, the
paths of p and r are unaffected and the level of e does not change immediately.
However, the currency begins to appreciate over time so as to offset rising
foreign prices and the higher level of r*. This result may seem strange: a rise
in foreign trend inflation should be associated with a rise in foreign monetary
growth and hence an appreciation of the domestic currency. The reason e does not
jump immediately in the present model is the small country assumption, which arti-
ficially holds p constant when foreign inflation rises. In a two—country model,
an increase in foreign money growth would move the exchange rate on impact.
7. Does the discrete, anticipated fall in the interest rate r at time T repre-
sents a violation of this principle? The answer is no, essentially because the
short—term interest rate r is the nominal return on a bond of instantaneous
maturity. What cannot jump, in the present setting, is the price of a long—term
bond or consol. If represents the price of a consol and C Is the coupon
payment, then, under perfect substitution, the short—term interest rate must
satisfy the arbitrage condition r(C + pC)/pC equating instantaneous returns on
short— and long—term assets. The saddle—path solution for as a function of the
coupon C and expected future short rates is:
P fCexp(—fr.rdt)ds.
Thus, does not jump when an anticipated discrete jump In r occurs. Rogoff
(1979) studies the Impact of anticipated monetary disturbances on the term struc—— 73—
tureof interest rates. For a more detailed discussion of the asset—price con-
tinuity condition, see Calvo (1977).
It is apparent from (2.10) and the definitions of the forcing functions x and
z that anticipated discrete jumps in the foreign price level p have no impact on
the exchange rate until the moment they occur (provided the expected paths of the
other exogenous variables are not simultaneously affected). This fact does appear
to contradict the asset—price continuity condition, since an anticipated discrete
jump in then implies an equal and opposite anticipated discrete jump in e. The
small—country assumption is again responsible for this rather artificial violation
of the continuity condition (cf. footnote 6, above). Because anticipated discrete
jumps In p would generally be Impossible in an explicit two—country model, the
problem would not arise; and we therefore assume In what follows that the path of
is expected to be continuous.
8.This is also a property of the Lucas (1982) model discussed in section 5.2.
When A == 0,and are given by mt + [(a—)/]t —(/)gt—p and t=
tnt — [(1—a4')/FYt + {(1—a)/]gIt is important to keep in mind that many of
the anticipated discrete price jumps possible in the small—country case when=0
or A =0would be impossible in a two—country model if the corresponding foreign
interest elasticities differed from zero.
9.The analysis here differs from that in Flood and Garber (1983) because we
assume agents know the date at which the return to fixed rates will take place.
Flood and Carber allow that date to be endogenously determined as the date of the
exchange rate's first passage through its new peg, but they are able to obtain a
determinate solution to their problem only through the tacit assumption that central—
bank foreign reserves are not expected to jump at the moment of pegging. No
theoretical justification for such an assumption has been suggested, however.— 74-
10.Other exogenous variables are unaffected, as always. We also assume that the
monetary and fiscal policies pursued both before and after pegging do not result
in a speculative attack on the central bank's reserves.
11. The pricecan differ from ,theoutput price clearing the goods market in a
full flexible—price equilibrium. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1984) show that the alter-
native pricing rule Pt =(yt
—Yt)+ leads to an observationally equivalent
exchange—rate model ifis chosen suitably. Dornbusch (1976b) implicitly adopts
the latter pricing scheme. Frankel (1979), Liviatan (1980), and Buiter and Miller
(1982) allow for an inflationary steady state by appending to the Phillips curve
an expectations term equal to the current monetary growth rate. This formulation
is consistent with rational expectations only if there are no anticipated changes
in money growth or other exogenous variables (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1984).
12. In general, one can say that the exchange rate overshoots in response to a
shock if its impact change exceeds the change that would be necessary if all pre-
determined variables could move immediately to their long—run levels. Flood
(1979) offers this definition of overshooting. In the present context, the
"long—run" level of the predetermined domestic output price is its flexible—price
value. But, as we shall see below, overshooting can arise even with flexible pri-
ces if behavior is influenced by predetermined asset stocks that adjust over time
toward some long—run target.
13. The case shown in figure 3.1 implies exchange—rate overshooting in
response to an unanticipated money supply change. There are two other cases.
If the first inequality in (3.18) is reversed, the same disturbance causes
undershooting [cf. (3.13)]. If only the second inequality in (3.18) is reversed,
there is overshooting and the f 0locus is negatively, rather than positively,— 75—
sloped.In all cases the long—run equilibrium is a saddle point, but when
a —4)1+eCY) < 0,the saddle path slopes upward.
14.Marston'schapterincludes extensive references to the literature in this area.
15.The possibility of a temporary appreciation is due entirely to the effect of
money on expenditure: if the relative price of non—traded goods is pushed suf-
ficiently high, a currency appreciation may be required to restore money—market
equilibrium in the short run. A similar result is derived by Kind (1982) in a
sticky—price model incorporating external asset accumulation.
16.In the present model, as in that of Flood and Hodrlck (1983), only unper-
ceived (or unanticipated) money has real effects. As we shall see In the next
section, however, a fully understood change In trend inflation can have real
effects in models with external asset accumulation. These real effects are absent
in this particular model because money demand is insensitive to th nominal
interest rate [equation (3.24)] and expenditure depends, not on real money balan-
ces, but on the unperceived component of the nominal money supply.
17. A satisfactory treatment of portfolio diversification naturally requires spe-
cification of both investors' preferences and the stochastic processes generating
real returns. For a discussion of these topics, see chapter 15 by Branson and
Henderson.
18. This model is more general than It seems to be, for it would be easy to intro-
duce a domestic—currency bond paying an interest rate linked to the foreign rate
by interest parity. Under perfect substitution, however, the fraction of domestic
wealth held in the form of foreign—currency bonds is indeterminate, and so unan-
ticipated shocks causing exchange—rate changes have indeterminate wealth effects.
The problem does not arise in portfolio models assuming that bonds of different— 76—
currencydenomination are imperfect substitutes. In chapter 15, Branson and
Henderson discuss portfolio—balance models that include imperfectly substitutable
interest—bearing assets.
19. In principle, consumption is also a function of the real interest rate r* ,as
in previous sections. Because r* is held constant, it does not appear explicitly
in (4.2).
20. There is an implicit assumption that the central bank does not hold interest—
bearing foreign reserves. If these were held, the income they yielded could be
used to help finance government outlays.
21. Henderson and Rogoff (1982) study the stability properties of a two—country
portfolio—balance model and allow for the possibility of negative net foreign
asset stocks. Kouri (1983, appendix 3) discusses a small—country case. These
authors conclude that saddle—path stability must always obtain under rational
expectations. However, this result follows from their assumption that interest
earnings on foreign assets do not affect the current account. As expression
(4.11) shows, the present model always has the saddle—path property in the special
case r*0; but if r*>O, an otherwise well—behaved model can become completely
unstable once the possibility that 1 —L< 0 is admitted. Fortunately, this is
never a problem in a model that Incorporates an appropriate definition of wealth.
As section 5, below, shows, the private intertemporal budget constraint (4.1) and
the government constraint (4.5) imply that the present value of future private
consumption is bounded from above by F + (+)/r* in equilibrium [see equation
(5.14)]. Accordingly, that quantity will normally be positive.
22. In the case where F/3F > 0, the F0 locus is positively sloped but steeper
than the P. =0locus. The saddle path SS lies between these two loci and thus
slopes upward as in figure 4.1.— 77—
23.We elaborate on this point in section 4.2; see also Kouri and Macedo (1978).
Another exception can occur when there are more than two countries (Krugman,
1983). Two distinct alternative mechanisms can give rise to the familiar correla-
tion between the exchange rate and current account along a convergent path. The
pattern arises in models assuming imperfect asset substitutability when domestic
residents have a greater marginal propensity to hold wealth in the form of
domestic—currency bonds than do foreigners (see chapter 15 by Branson and
Henderson). Even when all bonds are perfect substitutes and wealth does not enter
the money—demand function, the pattern will arise when domestic and foreign goods
are Imperfect substitutes in consumption, the terms of trade are endogenous,
domestic residents have a relative preference for domestic goods, and the home
goods market is stable in the Walrasian sense (see Calvo and Rodriguez, 1977;
Dornbusch and Fischer, 1980; and Obstfeld, 1980). This second case reflects the
usual transfer mechanism whereby a current—account induced transfer of wealth from
abroad raises demand for home goods, improving the terms of trade.
24.An anticipated increase in the money stock can induce current—account adjust-
ment, however (Dornbusch and Fischer, 1980). We have considered a "helicopter"
monetary expansion rather than an expansion achieved through a central—bank
purchase of bonds. The latter operation has the same effect as the helicopter
expansion if individuals fully capitalize expected future transfer payments from
the government (as they do here). Because the interest earnings on bondspur-
chased from the public are merely returned to the public in the form of transfers,
there are no real effects (Obstfeld, 1981, and Stockman, 1983). If capitalization
is incomplete, however, an official bond purchase will induce a current—account
surplus, as in Kouri (1976, 1983).
25. When F/3F > 0 (the case discussed in footnote 22), it is possible that long—
run real balances rise in response to an increase in j. Long—run foreignassets— 78—
mustalso rise in this case. Allonecan say in general is that the ratio of
realbalances to other wealth must fall.
26.In the case shown in figure 4.2, the exchange rate overshoots (in the sense
discussed in footnote 12).
27. The model would not be altered if trade in equities were introduced, but the
assumption in the text avoids some additional notation. If trade in capital goods
were allowed, however, the rate of domestic investment would become indeterminate.
28. The factor intensity assumption is crucial, as it yields both the uniqueness
K
of P [from equation (4.13fl and the stability of the capital—accumulation process.
It is also important that capital depreciates at a positive rate. If c were zero,
the economy would be specialized at the steady state and the Stolper—Samuelson and
Rybczynskl arguments would therefore not apply.
29. As footnote 22 suggests, there is an alternative configuration in which the
V —£=0locus slopes upward.
30. Another class of models introduces money through the assumption of finitely—
lived, overlapping generations. See, for example, Helpman and Razin (1979),
Kareken and Wallace (1981), Clarida (1982), Eaton (1982), and Lapan and Enders
(1983). Limited space precludes an adequate discussion of the interesting
questions raised by these models.
31. The utility function is strictly concave and twice continuously differen-
tiable. Also assumed are the standard Inada conditions. Both consumption and
money services are normal goods.
32. The calculation leads to the equation
fCsexp[_r*(s_t)]dsFt + —+11m £sexp[r*(st)I.— 79—
By(5.10), however, urn £sexp[_r*(s_t)] =t(limexp{[_r* +(r*_)/R](s_t)}). s÷ s+
The last limit is zero because of the assumption that _r* +(r*_5)/R<0,
33. The intertemporal welfare criterion with an endogenous time preference rate
is no longer time additive, unlike the criterion 4 given by equation (5.1). Lucas
and Stokey (1982) study a general optimal growth model with heterogenous consumers
whose intertecnporal preferences are not time additive. They, too, find that "the
hypothesis of increasing marginal impatience ...appearsto be an essential com-
ponent that any theory within the class considered in this paper must possess if
it is to generate dynamics under which wealth distributions converge to deter-
minate, stationary equilibria in which all agents have positive wealth and con-
sumption levels." See also Epstein and Hynes (1983). If the constant time pre-
ference hypothesis is retained, the assumption that real bonds (as well as real
money balances) yield direct utility leads to a model with a unique small—country
steady state (Liviatan, 1981).
34. Helpman and Razin (1982) emphasize the real wealth—redistribution effects of
unanticipated increases in money supplies when there are unindexed nominal bonds.
Note that equation (5.27) would still hold if bonds were indexed, as assumed in
section 5.3, below.
35. The terminal condition used here requires that all debts be paid at the end
of the final period.
36. Obviously a Cobb-Douglas utility function leads to the result that the
exchange rate in the final period is independent of the supply of non—traded goods
(though it is not independent of the supply of traded goods). See Stockman (1983).— 80—
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